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Fielding congressional questioning during the financial crisis, former Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan expressed his “distress” in discovering a “flaw”
in his free-market beliefs: “Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of
lending institutions to protect shareholder’s equity (myself especially) are in a state
of shocked disbelief.”1 The financial crisis has also prompted the jurist and famous
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Chicago School theorist Richard A. Posner to reconsider some of his earlier
beliefs.2
Some say that the Chicago School’s economic theories—with their strong
presumption of rational, self-interested profit maximizers with perfect willpower—
lost their luster within academic circles over twenty years ago with the rise of postChicago School game theories. The post-Chicago School used rational actor
models to challenge traditional Chicago predictions. Nonetheless, antitrust’s
economic theories, whether derived from the Chicago,3 post-Chicago,4 or Harvard
Schools,5 continue to assume rational self-interested market participants operate in
the market with perfect willpower.
This rationality assumption is under attack from several interdisciplinary
economic fields, most notably behavioral economics. Behavioral economics, the
management consulting firm McKinsey & Company recently observed, “is now
mainstream.”6 Even before the financial crisis, behavioral economics was a hot
topic. It is a staple in graduate economics programs, business schools, and
increasingly in law schools.7 Recent best-selling books have featured behavioral
economics, such as The Myth of the Rational Market,8 Animal Spirits,9 Predictably
Irrational,10 and Nudge.11 Behavioral economics has also led to subspecialties in
the areas of

2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND
(2009); Marcus Baram, Judge Richard Posner Questions His
Free-Market Faith in “A Failure of Capitalism,” HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2009,
6:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/20/judge-richard-posner-disc_n_188950.
html; John Cassidy, Interview with Richard Posner, NEW YORKER BLOG (Jan. 13,
2010), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2010/01/interview-with-richardposner.html#ixzz0hJIhHeop (“The more informal economics of Keynes has made a big
comeback because people realize that even though it is kind of loose . . . it seems to have
more of a grasp of what is going on in the economy.”).
3. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF (1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001).
4. See, e.g., 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 113, at 140 (3d ed. 2006)
(“As a general proposition business firms are (or must be assumed to be) profit
maximizers . . . .”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review & Critique, 2
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 258 (2001); Symposium, Post-Chicago Economics, 63 ANTITRUST L.J.
445 (1995).
5. See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1
(2007) (summarizing contributions of Harvard School to modern antitrust analysis).
6. Dan Lovallo & Olivier Sibony, The Case for Behavioral Strategy, MCKINSEY Q.,
Spring 2010, at 30, 30.
7. Law schools, such as the University of Tennessee, Yale, Harvard, and Georgetown,
offer behavioral law and economics seminars.
8. JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD,
AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009).
9. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009).
10. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS (2008).
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subjective well-being and happiness;12
the media (including demand-driven media bias);13
marketing (including the paradox of choice);14
behavioral finance;15
criminal justice;16
sports;17
health care;18

11. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
12. See, e.g., RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE 29–30
(2005); Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, Some Uses of Happiness Data in Economics,
20 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 26 (2006); Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists
Learn from Happiness Research?, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 402 (2002); Daniel Kahneman &
Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, 20 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3 (2006); Daniel Kahneman & Robert Sugden, Experienced Utility as a Standard of
Policy Evaluation, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 161 (2005); Daniel Kahneman, Alan B.
Krueger, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur A. Stone, Would You Be Happier If You
Were Richer? A Focusing Illusion, 312 SCIENCE 1908, 1908–10 (2006); Richard Layard,
Happiness and Public Policy: A Challenge to the Profession, 116 ECON. J. C24 (2006);
George Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of Decision and
Experience Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1795 (2008); Maurice E. Stucke,
Money, Is That What I Want?: Competition Policy and the Role of Behavioral Economics, 50
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893, 928–40 (2010).
13. See, e.g., Stefano DellaVigna & Ethan Kaplan, The Political Impact of Media Bias,
in FACT FINDER, FACT FILTER: HOW MEDIA REPORTING AFFECTS PUBLIC POLICY (Roumeen
Islam ed., forthcoming), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~sdellavi/wp/mediabiaswb0706-25.pdf; Matthew A. Baum & Tim Groeling, New Media and the Polarization of American
Political Discourse, 25 POL. COMM. 345 (2008); Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro,
Competition and Truth in the Market for News, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (2008); Matthew A.
Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Media, Education and Anti-Americanism in the Muslim
World, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 117 (2004); Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, What Drives
Media Slant? Evidence from U.S. Daily Newspapers, 78 ECONOMETRICA 35 (2010); Charles
S. Taber & Milton Lodge, Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs, 50
AM. J. POL. SCI. 755 (2006).
14. See, e.g., BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004);
Simona Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The Dark Side of Choice: When Choice Impairs Social
Welfare, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 24 (2006). As for the implications of the paradox of
choice on the poor, see Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Behavioral
Economics and Marketing in Aid of Decision Making Among the Poor, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y &
MARKETING 8, 12 (2006).
15. See, e.g., 2 ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 2005);
ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2d ed. 2005).
16. See, e.g., Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, Playing Dice with
Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision
Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188 (2006); Richard H. McAdams &
Thomas S. Ulen, Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics (John M. Olin Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 440, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1299963.
17. See, e.g., Devin G. Pope & Maurice E. Schweitzer, Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse?
Persistent Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes, 101 AM. ECON.
REV. 129 (2011).
18. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Behavioral
Economics Perspective, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1189 (2009).
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behavioral political economy;19
behavioral institutional design;20
behavioral labor economics;21 and
behavioral industrial organization.22

The financial crisis raised important issues of market failure, weak regulation,
moral hazard, and our lack of understanding about how many markets actually
operate. The crisis has also prompted policy makers in the United States to
reexamine the assumptions underlying the prevailing neoclassical economic
theories.23 Competition authorities in the European Commission,24 the United
Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading,25 and the United States26 are interested in
behavioral economics. The American Antitrust Institute (AAI)27 and antitrust

19. Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 315, 364 (2009).
20. Id. at 364–65.
21. Id. at 362–63.
22. Id. at 361–62.
23. See John Authers, Wanted: New Model for Markets, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at 9.
24. See Eliana Garcés, The Impact of Behavioral Economics on Consumer and
Competition Policies, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 145 (2010); Press Release, European
Union Comm’n for Consumers, Why Consumers Behave the Way They Do: Commissioner
Kuneva Hosts High Level Conference on Behavioural Economics (Nov. 28, 2008), available
at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1836&format=HTML&
aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
25. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING (U.K.), THE IMPACT OF PRICE FRAMES ON
CONSUMER DECISION MAKING (2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/
economic_research/OFT1226.pdf; Matthew Bennett, John Fingleton, Amelia Fletcher, Liz
Hurley & David Ruck, What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for Competition Policy?, 6
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 111, 118 (2010); Amelia Fletcher, Chief Economist, Office of
Fair Trading (U.K.), What Do Policy-Makers Need from Behavioural Economists?, Address
at the European Commission Consumer Affairs Conference (Nov. 28, 2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/dyna/conference/programme_en.htm.
26. Commissioner Rosch of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), for example, has
been interested in the implications of behavioral economics for competition policy. See J.
Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Behavioral Economics: Observations
Regarding Issues that Lie Ahead, Remarks at the Vienna Competition Conference (June 9,
2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100609viennaremarks.pdf; J. Thomas
Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Managing Irrationality: Some Observations on
Behavioral Economics and the Creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency,
Remarks at the Conference on the Regulation of Consumer Financial Products (Jan. 6, 2010)
[hereinafter Rosch, Managing Irrationality], available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/
rosch/100106financial-products.pdf. Likewise, Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General in the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, and Joe Farrell, Director of the
FTC’s Bureau of Economics, recently acknowledged that behavioral economics may offer
insights relevant to antitrust and consumer protection analysis. See Roundtable Interview
with Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2010, at 1, 7–8.
27. 9th Annual Conference: The Next Antitrust Agenda, AMERICAN ANTITRUST
INSTITUTE (June 18, 2008), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/9th-annual-conferencenext-antitrust-agenda (audio recordings from the conference); see also AM. ANTITRUST INST.,
THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE’S TRANSITION REPORT
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scholars28 are discussing the applicability of behavioral economics to competition
policy. Soon, enterprising antitrust lawyers may raise behavioral economics
findings in white papers to the agencies or in federal court pleadings. In fact, the
literature on behavioral economics was recently raised before the U.S. Supreme
Court,29 in a case where two Chicago School theorists (Judges Posner and
Easterbrook) disagreed on the mutual fund industry’s efficiency.30
The immediate question is to what extent the irrational conduct that behavioral
economics identifies should have implications for evaluating whether conduct is
anticompetitive. The Chicago School’s neoclassical economic theories teach that
irrationality is irrelevant to antitrust doctrine: rational firms eliminate irrationality
from the marketplace. After the financial crisis, however, one cannot assume that
markets operate as efficiently as the Chicago School predicts. Antitrust policy
makers must inquire what role behavioral economics can play in the agencies’
enforcement of the federal antitrust laws.31
This Article addresses the implications of the increasing interest in behavioral
economics for competition policy. Part I provides an overview of behavioral
economics. Part II discusses how the assumption of rational, self-interested profit
maximizers became so embedded in antitrust policy. Part III discusses to what
extent the behavioral economics literature can inform antitrust policies and cause
lawmakers to question their neoclassically based assumptions. Part IV offers
several recommendations related to the practical application of behavioral
economics to antitrust law going forward.

COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 26, 172, 185, 200–
01, 272–75 (2008) (recommending more empirical analysis to further antitrust policies
involving cartels, mergers, and media industries). The British Institute of International and
Comparative Law has also shown an interest in behavioral economics. See BRITISH INST. OF
INT’L AND COMPARATIVE LAW, http://www.biicl.org/clf/clfmeetings2009 (hosting a
Competition Law Forum on behavioral economics in July 2009).
28. At the Next Generation of Antitrust Scholarship Conference held at the New York
University School of Law in January 2010, several authors applied behavioral economics to
antitrust policy. See Maurice E. Stucke, Am I a Price-Fixer? A Behavioral Economics
Analysis of Cartels, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS: A CRITICAL INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF
AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds.,
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535720; Max Huffman, Behavioral
Exploitation and Antitrust (Jan. 29, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www3.luc.edu/law/academics/special/center/antitrust/colloquium/pdfs/huffman_exploi
tation.pdf; Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to
the Rule of Reason After Leegin (Dec. 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522948.
29. Brief for Robert Litan et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Jones v. Harris
Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010) (No. 08–856).
30. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, 537
F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008). The Court ultimately eschewed the issue, holding that the debate
between Judges Easterbrook and Posner was “a matter for Congress, not the courts.” Jones v.
Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1431 (2010).
31. For purposes of this Article, the relevant laws are sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006), and section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
ON
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I. OVERVIEW OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
A. What Is Behavioral Economics?
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that humans are rational, self-interested
beings with perfect willpower. In making determinations under their Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice’s
Antitrust Division, for example, assume that actual behavior comports with
rational, self-interested (i.e., profit-maximizing) behavior.32 In conduct cases, the
U.S. federal courts dismiss complaints or grant summary judgment if antitrust
plaintiffs’ theories do not make “economic sense,” such as alleging economically
irrational behavior.33
Behavioral economics uses methods from neuroscience and social sciences,
such as psychology and sociology, to understand the limits of this assumption.34
Testing this rationality assumption through experiments,35 behavioral economists
find that people systematically and predictably do not behave in certain scenarios as
neoclassical economic theory predicts.36 Instead, behavioral economics
characterizes human behavior as defined by three traits: bounded rationality,
bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest.
1. Bounded Rationality
In theory, rational agents seek out the optimal amount of information, and
readily and continually update their prior factual beliefs with relevant and reliable
empirical data. It is similar to a treasure hunt: as we receive new factual clues along
the way, we revise our beliefs and modify our behavior. In contrast, bounded
rationality acknowledges the distinction between reasoning versus intuition.37
Consumers are not perfectly objective and rational Bayesians, who readily update

32. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 1 (2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (“In evaluating how a merger will
likely change a firm’s behavior, the Agencies focus primarily on how the merger affects
conduct that would be most profitable for the firm.”).
33. Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 316
(2010); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (requiring a plaintiff
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
34. For interesting surveys of the behavioral economics research, see generally
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin F. Camerer, George Loewenstein & Matthew
Rabin eds., 2004); MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE (Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd & Ernst Fehr
eds., 2005); DellaVigna, supra note 19; Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler,
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1487 (1998).
35. See Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present,
Future, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 7; DellaVigna, supra
note 19.
36. See Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L.
REV. 237, 242–43 (2008).
37. Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1451 (2003).
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prior factual beliefs whenever appraised of reliable information.38 Instead, while we
may maintain an illusion of objectivity, our goals can bias our beliefs about
everything from our perception of ourselves, other people, and events, to the value
of goods or services, to our evaluation of scientific evidence—much like the goals
of a prosecutor seeking to convince the court of the defendant’s guilt.39 As a result,
we access only a subset of our relevant knowledge and give undue weight to
evidence that supports our beliefs, while discounting evidence that undercuts our
beliefs.
In one experiment, the subjects received the same twenty-seven pages of
evidentiary materials from an actual Texas lawsuit filed by an injured motorcyclist
against the driver of the automobile that collided with him.40 Subjects were
randomly assigned the role of plaintiff or defendant. After reading the case
materials, they predicted what the judge had awarded and what a “fair” settlement
would be. Participants playing the plaintiff predicted a significantly larger award by
the judge (on average $14,527 higher than defendants’ prediction). The plaintiffs
and defendants each recalled more arguments favoring their side, and weighed the
arguments favoring their side more heavily. In a later experiment, the subjects first
read the case materials and offered their estimates of the judge’s award and a fair
settlement. Only then were they told of their role as plaintiff or defendant. Those
who learned their roles after they offered estimates had closer estimates of the
likely award, and were significantly more likely to settle.
Another key insight of bounded rationality is that humans rely on rules of thumb
(heuristics) in making decisions, and engage in a couple of steps of iterated
reasoning. For example, framing effects (the way the choice is framed, such as a
sure gain or avoiding a loss) can alter the way we decide.41 In one experiment,
individuals could choose either an eighty percent chance of winning $4000 or
$3000 guaranteed.42 Rational profit maximizers should opt for the greater
discounted value—the eighty percent chance ($3200); yet most people (eighty

38. See Bayesian, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/bayesian (defining Bayesian as “being, relating to, or involving statistical methods
that assign probabilities or distributions to events (as rain tomorrow) or parameters (as a
population mean) based on experience or best guesses before experimentation and data
collection and that apply Bayes’ theorem to revise the probabilities and distributions after
obtaining experimental data”).
39. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 482–95
(1990).
40. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role
of Self-Serving Biases, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 328.
41. Under the Asian Disease hypothetical, 600 people are expected to die. The majority
choose Program A, saving a sum certain number of lives (200 people), versus Program B,
which offers a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved (and a two-thirds
probability that no one will be saved). Yet a substantial majority did not choose Program A
when it presented a sum certain number of deaths (400) versus Program B (a one-third
probability that 600 people will be saved (no deaths) and a two-thirds probability that 600
people will die). Kahneman, supra note 37, at 1458.
42. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 268 (1979).

1534

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:1527

percent surveyed) were risk adverse and opted for $3000.43 But when they stood to
lose either $3000 versus an eighty percent chance of losing $4000, many became
risk seeking and opted for the latter.44 Moreover, losses closer to a reference point
hurt more than the joy from comparable gains.45 Bounded rationality encompasses
other anomalies in human decision making, including:
• the endowment effect—when we demand much more to give
up and sell an object than what we would be willing to pay to
acquire that object;46
• status quo bias—when the choice of default option impacts the
outcome;47
• anchoring effects—how a randomly chosen standard may
subsequently influence a judgment on the same task;48
• availability heuristic—when we assess the probability of an
event by asking whether relevant examples come readily to
mind;49
• representative heuristic—when we ignore the “base rates and
overestimate the correlation between what something appears
to be and what something actually is”;50
• overconfidence bias—where, for example, executives in
several behavioral studies were overconfident in their ability to
manage a company, systematically underestimated their
competitors’ strength, and were prone to self-serving
interpretations of reality (such as taking credit for positive
outcomes, and blaming the environment for negative
outcomes);51

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Kahneman, supra note 37, at 1456.
46. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES
OF ECONOMIC LIFE 63 (1992); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325,
1327 tbl.1 (1990) (summarizing evaluation disparity studies); Jolls et al., supra note 34, at
1482, 1484, 1498.
47. See, e.g., THALER, supra note 46, at 68–70.
48. One series of experiments is to establish an arbitrary initial price (such as the last
two digits of one’s social security number) in the test subjects’ minds. While that initial price
is arbitrary, once it is established in their minds, it shapes what the subjects are willing to
pay for that item and related items. ARIELY, supra note 10, at 25–28; see also Englich et al.,
supra note 16 (describing how sentencing anchors can influence judges and prosecutors).
49. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Market Efficiency and Rationality:
The Peculiar Case of Baseball, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1390, 1395–96 (2004) (book review)
(noting a study that found that individuals are more likely to think that more words on a
random page end with “-ing” than have the letter “n” as their next to last letter); Kahneman,
supra note 37, at 1466–67 (people estimating twice the number of murders in Detroit versus
the state of Michigan).
50. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1086 (2000) (citing
Tversky and Kahneman’s bank teller problem); see Kahneman, supra note 37, at 1462.
51. Cristoph Engel, The Behaviour of Corporate Actors: How Much Can We Learn from

2011]

BEHAVIORAL ANTITRUST

1535

• optimistic bias—when we believe that good things are more
likely (and bad things less likely) than average to happen to
us;52 and
• hindsight bias—our tendency to increase the likelihood of an
event’s occurrence after learning that it actually did occur.53
2. Bounded Willpower
Willpower refers to the notion of self-control: when we know something is bad
for us, we avoid it. Bounded willpower, in contrast, refers to when we knowingly
engage in actions known to be detrimental and therefore act contrary to our longterm interests.54 As anyone who has ever overeaten, overspent, or otherwise
succumbed to temptation (despite having the best intentions not to do so) can
confirm, many people are not very good at predicting their willpower.
Recent neurological research has examined to what extent the discrepancy
between short-run and long-run human preferences reflects the activation of
different parts of the brain’s neural system.55 This research suggests that choices
that involve an immediate reward can disproportionately activate the impulsive part
of the brain (the limbic system) rather than the more deliberative part of the brain
that engages in long-term cost-benefit analyses (the lateral prefrontal cortex).56 At a
practical level, these insights suggest that, in situations that involve a short-term
gain even at a long-term cost, we may not engage in the cost-benefit analysis
expected under rational choice theory.
Thus, recognizing our bounded willpower, we at times seek commitment
devices. We opt for automatic payroll deductions into 401(k) retirement plans,
certificates of deposit, or other plans with liquidity restrictions to constrain our
immediate consumption.57 We may place the alarm clock further away, not shop
the Experimental Literature?, 6 J. INST. ECON. 445, 446 (2010); see also DellaVigna, supra
note 19, at 317, 342–43 (discussing field experiments).
52. See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk
Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 313 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
53. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 50, at 1095–1100.
54. See Jolls et al., supra note 34, at 1480.
55. Samuel M. McClure, David I. Laibson, George Loewenstein & Jonathan D. Cohen,
Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed Monetary Rewards, 306 SCIENCE
503, 503–07 (2004).
56. See id. at 506 (showing that choices involving an immediate outcome
disproportionately activated the limbic system and that, in contrast, when participants chose
a long-run option, the lateral prefrontal cortex was significantly more active than the limbic
system).
57. For the effectiveness of changing the default option to automatic enrollment in
retirement accounts, see generally Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More
Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON.
S164 (2004); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in
401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149 (2001); John Beshears,
James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, The Importance of Default Options for
Retirement Savings Outcomes: Evidence from the United States, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
12009,
Jan.
2006),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12009.
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when we are hungry, or set our watch slightly ahead of time. These commitment
devices—while a rational response to our bounded willpower—can lead us to
“overcorrect” for our bounded willpower.58 We may pay more for less of what we
like too much (such as buying cigarettes individually or by the pack, rather than by
the carton). And, more generally, we may behave in ways contrary to the tenets of
wealth maximization (such as giving the U.S. government an interest-free loan by
withholding too much taxes from our paycheck to ensure a return at tax time).
3. Bounded Self-Interest
Self-interest means people seek to maximize their wealth and other material
goals, and generally do not care about other social goals to the extent they conflict
with personal wealth maximization. Bounded self-interest, as behavioral
experiments confirm, means that human motivation is more nuanced and complex
than this simplistic assumption of self-interest.59
Psychological and experimental economic evidence shows that people care
about treating others, and being treated, fairly.60 Recent experiments in bargaining
settings, for example, systematically show “that substantial fractions of most
populations adhere to moral rules, willingly give to others, and punish those who
offend standards of appropriate behavior, even at a cost to themselves and with no
expectation of material reward.”61 This “strong reciprocity” in human behavior,
however, also entails “a predisposition . . . to punish [at personal cost] those who
violate the norms of cooperation . . . even when it is implausible to expect that
these costs will be repaid.”62 Similarly, behavioral experiments suggest that many
people do not free ride at all (or to the extent that rational choice theory predicts).
In these public goods experiments, “people have a tendency to cooperate until
experience shows that those with whom they’re interacting are taking advantage of
them.”63 Consequently, individuals at times act benevolently even when it is not in
their financial interest (such as tipping waiters and waitresses in cities they are
unlikely to revisit) and will sacrifice monetary gains to punish those they feel are

58. See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV.
103, 111–12 (1999) (discussing how sophisticated individuals recognize their bounded
willpower and thus “are more inclined than naifs to do [tasks] now, irrespective of whether it
is costs, rewards, or both that are immediate”).
59. See Stucke, supra note 12, at 909.
60. See Jolls et al., supra note 34, at 1479.
61. Samuel Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine
“The Moral Sentiments”: Evidence from Economic Experiments, 320 SCIENCE 1605, 1606
(2008).
62. Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd & Ernest Fehr, Explaining Altruistic
Behavior in Humans, 24 EVOLUTION & HUMAN BEHAV. 153, 153–54 (2003) (arguing further
that “the evolutionary success of our species and the moral sentiments that have led people
to value freedom, equality, and representative government are predicated upon strong
reciprocity and related motivations that go beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal
altruism”).
63. THALER, supra note 46, at 14.
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acting unfairly, such as by deviating from an established reference point of
“fairness.”
One frequently cited experiment of negative reciprocal behavior and bounded
self-interest is the “Ultimatum Game,” where a subject is given some money and
must offer a second subject some portion thereof.64 If the second subject accepts the
offer, both can keep the money. If the second subject rejects the offer, neither keeps
the money. Neoclassical economic theory predicts people will offer the smallest
amount—one penny. If everyone pursues their self-interest, the first subject would
selfishly want as much money as possible; the second subject recognizes that a
penny is better than nothing.
But actual experiments of this Ultimatum Game in over twenty countries show
the contrary. In expanding the Ultimatum Game experiment to fifteen small-scale
economies from twelve countries on four continents,65 participants reciprocated and
did not offer the nominal amount. Nor did high financial stakes eliminate this
bounded self-interest.66 Most offered significantly more than the nominal amount
(ordinarily forty to fifty percent of the total amount available), and recipients
rejected nominal amounts (less than twenty percent of the total amount available)
about half the time.67 Consequently, most receivers in this game forgo wealth to
punish unfair offers, and offerors generally offer more than the nominal profitmaximizing amount.68 Wealth may still be relevant to offerors, but unlike the selfinterested profit maximizer, offerors recognize the need for a sense of fairness and
equity to maximize their return.
Similarly, one recent study found that informal religious norms can play an
important role in supporting a competitive market economy.69 The study measured
the individuals’ propensities for fairness and willingness to punish unfairness. The
study involved fifteen populations that vary in their degree of market integration
and their participation in a world religion (such as Islam or Christianity).70 The
financial stakes in the behavioral experiments were set at one day’s local wages.71

64. See HERBERT GINTIS, THE BOUNDS OF REASON: GAME THEORY AND THE UNIFICATION
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 49, 57–58 (2009) (discussing results of Ultimatum Game);
Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of
Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 367 (1982).
65. Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert
Gintis & Richard McElreath, In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15
Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73 (2001).
66. See, e.g., id. at 74 (using equivalent of a day or two’s wages for amount divided in
experiment).
67. Gintis et al., supra note 62, at 157; Henrich et al., supra note 65, at 75 (noting that in
industrial societies, offers below twenty percent are rejected with a probability of 0.40 to
0.60); Jolls et al., supra note 34, at 1490.
68. Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First
Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 529–30 (2007).
69. Joseph Henrich, Jean Ensminger, Richard McElreath, Abigail Barr, Clark Barrett,
Alexander Bolyanatz, Juan Camilo Cardenas, Michael Gurven, Edwins Gwako, Natalie
Henrich, Carolyn Lesorogol, Frank Marlowe, David Tracer & John Ziker, Markets, Religion,
Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment, 327 SCIENCE 1480 (2010).
70. Id. at 1480.
71. Id. at 1482.
OF THE
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The results reflected a stark contrast between nomadic, nonintegrated, fully
subsistence societies with local religions (such as the Hadza population from
Tanzania) and fully market-incorporated societies with worldwide religions (such
as the residents of Missouri, United States, and Accra City, Ghana).72 The study
found that as market integration increases (as measured by the percentage of
purchased calories in diet), the people become more generous (sharing more of the
day’s wages with the other player in the Dictator Game).73 Likewise, as a society’s
participation in Islam or Christianity increases, so does the sharing in these
behavioral experiments increase.74
Aside from reciprocity, individuals at times act from an intrinsic motivation,
independent of any financial reward. Indeed, financial rewards can decrease (rather
than increase) motivation or the likelihood of the desired results.75 Likewise,
financial disincentives may not be as effective as social or ethical norms in curbing
unwanted behavior.76
B. Some Criticisms and Shortcomings of Behavioral Economics,
and Responses to Those Criticisms
Some observers are skeptical of the usefulness of behavioral economics. They
view it as merely amusing and argue that it is inapplicable to individual (or firm)
behavior in the marketplace.
1. Representativeness
One criticism is that behavioral economics experiments focus on certain persons
not representative of the total population (namely university students) in an
artificial setting (namely lab experiments).77 So naturally, students’ decisions in

72. Id. at 1483–84.
73. Id. at 1483 fig.1. In the Dictator Game, two anonymous players were allotted a sum
of money in a one-shot interaction. Player 1 had to decide how to divide this sum between
himself or herself and Player 2. Player 2 received the allocation (offer), and the game ended.
Id. at 1481.
74. Id. at 1482.
75. In one study, for example, high school students collected donations for a public
purpose in Israel’s annually publicized “donation days.” One group of students received a
pep talk about the importance of these donations. A second group, in addition to the pep talk,
was promised one percent of the amount collected (to be paid from an independent source).
A third group was promised ten percent of the amount collected. Under rational choice
theory, the third group, motivated by the greater financial incentive, should collect the most
donations. Instead, the groups promised the one percent and ten percent shares collected a
lower average amount ($153.67 and $219.33, respectively) than the group given only the pep
talk ($238.60). Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Incentives, Punishment, and Behavior, in
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 578–80.
76. See id. at 581–86.
77. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1566 (1998).
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experimental games with small financial stakes could differ from real market
behavior with often-greater financial stakes.78
But behavioral lab experiments enable researchers to isolate variables and
examine how behavior correlates with each variable (although one criticism from
noneconomists is that these experiments are an elaborate and costly way of telling
us what we already know). Moreover, today’s behavioral economics literature
includes field experiments and data from actual market transactions.79 Not
surprisingly, marketing companies are devoting resources on behavioral
experiments and neuroscience to learn more about consumers’ behavior decisions.80
2. Firm v. Individual Behavior
A second criticism is that the insights from behavioral economics about
individual behavior are not helpful in predicting firm behavior in competitive
markets.81 Market participants typically are repeat players who learn from and
correct their mistakes. Firms and their employees have greater incentives to
rationally profit maximize, as they often are subject to competitive pressures.82
Many firms benefit from the division of labor, and accordingly train or hire experts
to capture the benefits from specialized knowledge. Irrational participants
eventually exit the market. Thus, as Posner opines, “unusually ‘fair’ ” people will
avoid or be forced out of “roughhouse activities—including highly competitive
businesses, trial lawyering, and the academic rat race.”83 For several reasons, these
criticisms are misplaced.
First, neoclassical economists often use the stock market as the example that
most closely approximates perfect competition.84 But how many people after the
financial crisis still have faith in the efficient market hypothesis, which posits that
stock prices reflect their fundamental value (the discounted sum of expected future

78. At times, the behavior of university students is closer to rational choice theory. For
example, university students are more likely than non-students to give nothing in dictator
games. See Christoph Engel, Dictator Games: A Meta Study 13 (Jan. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1568732.
79. For one recent survey of the literature, see DellaVigna, supra note 19, at 320–65.
For a recent integration of field and lab experiments, see Devesh Rustagi, Stefanie Engel &
Michael Kosfeld, Conditional Cooperation and Costly Monitoring Explain Success in Forest
Commons Management, 330 SCIENCE 961, 961–64 (2010).
80. Stuart Elliott, A Quest to Learn What Drives Consumer Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 2010, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/business/media/
30adco.html.
81. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone II, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case
Against Behavioral Antitrust 9 (Oct. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1686389 (“First, while firms may be, at their core, self-selected
aggregations of individuals, it does not follow that firms necessarily behave with similar, or
similarly predictable, consequences.”).
82. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133,
140–41, 144–46 (2006) (arguing that consumers outside the lab have stronger incentives to
reduce error, which they are able to do through experience).
83. Posner, supra note 77, at 1570.
84. POSNER, supra note 3, at 164.

1540

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:1527

cash flow)? The behavioral finance literature questions the degree of efficiency in
the stock market and addresses the limits of arbitrage.85 Consequently, if
irrationality is not driven out of supposedly perfectly competitive markets, why
should we assume that irrationality is driven out in less efficient markets?
Accordingly, the assumption that bounded rational consumers magically transform
themselves individually or collectively into rational, far-sighted, strategic
maximizers with perfect willpower upon entering the workplace is empirically
suspect.
Indeed, there is evidence that firms as institutions may depart from rationality,
although at times in different ways and degrees than individuals do. People can
behave differently depending on situational factors, such as being alone or in
groups.86 Groups, at times, can minimize individual biases, but at other times (such
as cults, mobs, and “groupthink”87) groups can displace independent thinking. Firm
behavior itself can vary, as firms vary by purpose (nonprofit versus profit);
structure (partnership, family concern, conglomerate); national identity and cultural
norms (local firm, multinational); regulatory environment (utility versus
unregulated concern); and size (large versus small).
Take, for example, the United States’ antitrust challenge of MIT and eight Ivy
League universities.88 For years the universities collectively determined the amount
of financial aid for prospective students admitted to two or more of their
universities. MIT on appeal raised an interesting argument. In a perfectly
competitive market, price equals marginal cost, and no rational profit-maximizing
firm (outside of a predatory pricing scheme) would price below marginal cost. MIT
priced its discounted tuition to needy students at substantially below its marginal
cost of providing education for one year. Because profit-maximizing companies
would not engage in such “economically abnormal” behavior, MIT argued, its
activity must be noncommercial.89 The Third Circuit rejected MIT’s argument,90
but it implicitly accepted that firms do not always behave as rational profit
maximizers.91

85. See, e.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000); 1 ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed.,
1993); see also Diana B. Henriques, Odd Crop Prices Defy Economics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
28, 2008, at C1 (noting how on dozens of occasions since early 2006 futures contracts for
corn, wheat, and soybeans have expired at a price much higher than the day’s cash price for
those grains).
86. See generally PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD
PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2008).
87. See Robert S. Baron, So Right It’s Wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of
Polarized Group Decision Making, in 37 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
219 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2005).
88. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
89. Id. at 666.
90. The court noted that MIT’s full tuition figure was also significantly below its
marginal cost. So “whether the price charged for educational services is below marginal cost
is not probative of the commercial or noncommercial nature of the methodology utilized to
determine financial aid packages.” Id.
91. Id. at 672, 672 n.9 (discussing MIT’s “pure altruistic motive,” and noting that MIT
“could fill its class each year with affluent students who do not need financial assistance”).
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One explanation as to why firms behave irrationally is that firms cannot always
monitor and deter bounded rational employees from acting contrary to the firms’
long-term interests. As discussed above, “CEOs may be overly optimistic about the
profitability of mergers or other actions they undertake,” and “managers might face
incentives which induce them to care about relative rather than absolute profits.”92
Similarly, when executives conspire to fix prices, they are not always acting with
their firms’ knowledge or at their behest.
Second, bounded rationality, willpower, and self-interest can affect competition
through the individual behavior of the millions of atomistic self-employed workers
who supply their services or products into the supply chain.93 This group includes
self-employed farmers, ranchers, fishermen, freelance writers, doctors, lawyers, and
architects. These individuals can behave contrary to rational choice theory.94
Third, bounded rationality, willpower, and self-interest can affect competition
through the individual behavior of the hundreds of millions of consumers.
Individuals in the United States spend trillions of dollars annually on goods and
services ($3.201 trillion in purchases on credit, debit, and prepaid cards in 2009),95
so their bounded rational behavior can affect competition in many markets. Even if
firms were relatively more rational than consumers, behavioral economics is
relevant in understanding consumer decision making and how firms compete to
help or exploit these bounded rational consumers.
One staple of antitrust policy is predicting how consumers would respond to
firms raising the price of their goods or services by a small but significant
nontransitory amount. Price frames, under rational choice theory, should not affect
the consumers’ decision. But the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading (OFT)
recently studied how firms can use price frames to exploit bounded rational
consumers.96 The OFT’s behavioral experiment found that consumers deviated
from rational choice theory in the following five price frames: (i) “drip pricing,”
where a lower price is initially disclosed to the consumer and additional charges are
added as the sale progresses; (ii) “sales,” where the “sales” price is referenced off

92. Mark Armstrong & Steffen Huck, Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A
Primer, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3, 4 (2010); see supra text accompanying note 51.
93. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNUAL AVERAGES—TABLE
12: EMPLOYED PERSONS BY SEX, OCCUPATION, CLASS OF WORKER, FULL- OR PART-TIME
STATUS, AND RACE (2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat12.pdf (reporting
8.995 million self-employed non-agricultural workers and 836,000 self-employed
agricultural workers in the United States in 2009).
94. See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The
Role of Self-Serving Biases, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 326,
333 (public school teachers); Colin F. Camerer, Linda Babcock, George Lowenstein &
Richard H. Thaler, Labor Supply of New York City Cab Drivers: One Day at a Time, in
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 533 (questioning the intertemporal
substitution hypothesis that taxi drivers will work longer hours on high wage days); Colin F.
Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in ADVANCES IN
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 148, 149; Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Pär Anders
Granhag, Maria Hartwig & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to
Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133 (2010).
95. Card Debt Per U.S. Household, NILSON REPORT, May 2010, at 1, 9.
96. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 25.
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an inflated regular price (was $2, now $1); (iii) “complex pricing,” such as threefor-two offers, where the unit price requires some computation; (iv) “baiting,”
where sellers promote a special deal, but offer only a limited number of goods at
that price; and (v) “time limited offers,” where the special price is available for a
short period. Consumers made more mistakes and were especially worse off under
drip pricing and time-limited offers. Thus, one application of behavioral economics
to antitrust is to model consumer behavior and consider the effect of this behavior
on competition.
As these observations suggest, the question is not whether firms and consumers
are equally irrational, but the degree and type of biases and heuristics that different
firms display. Not surprisingly, there is already a wide body of research on this
topic in the business literature. That literature discusses the substantial variation in
the ways corporations learn (such as the routines and forms of organizational
structure they use).97 The empirical and theoretical work on organizational learning
rests on bounded rationality and offers several insights about how firms engage in
different forms of intrafirm conduct to overcome their bounded rationality and to
compete more effectively with other firms.98 Among the literature’s insights:
• firms that better implement and update their learning (such as
through routines) can better collect and exploit their
knowledge, yield greater productive efficiencies, and enjoy a
competitive advantage;99
• firms may improve feedback mechanisms, whereby employees
can learn from their mistakes and improve their reasoning and
willpower;100
• firms can promote different social, ethical, and moral values
that affect firm behavior,101 and therefore reduce their

97. See, e.g., Lovallo & Sibony, supra note 6, at 3 (noting a recent survey of 2207
executives where only twenty-eight percent said the quality of their companies’ strategic
decisions was generally good, sixty percent thought that bad decisions were about as
frequent as good ones, and twelve percent thought good decisions were altogether
infrequent).
98. See Linda Argote & Henrich R. Greve, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm—40 Years
and Counting: Introduction and Impact, 18 ORG. SCI. 337 (2007) (surveying A Behavioral
Theory of the Firm’s impact on organizational science research, including institutional
theory and population ecology); Giovanni Dosi & Luigi Marengo, On the Evolutionary and
Behavioral Theories of Organizations: A Tentative Roadmap, 18 ORG. SCI. 491 (2007).
99. See Argote & Greve, supra note 98, at 343.
100. See John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q.J.
ECON. 41 (2003) [hereinafter List, Market Experience]; John A. List, Neoclassical Theory
Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615, 615
(2004). For example, frequent and more experienced sports cards traders display less of an
endowment effect for sports cards (such as baseball trading cards) than for other items, such
as chocolates and mugs. List, Market Experience, supra, at 44.
101. Paul C. Nystrom, Differences in Moral Values Between Corporations, 9 J. BUS.
ETHICS 971, 974–76 (1990) (describing how closely matched corporations within industrial
sectors differed significantly in the perceived importance of the management’s moral
values).
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monitoring costs and increase their competitiveness by
inculcating a unique identity.102
Neoclassical economic theory, with its assumption of rational agents, offers few
insights on such intrafirm behavior. Logically, if firms behaved as rational profit
maximizers, one would not expect this form of competition. Rational firms could
not enjoy a competitive advantage in how they search and incorporate knowledge,
since they all automatically search for and act upon the optimal amount of
information. One would therefore not expect business executives to expend
resources on improving their decision processes if they indeed behaved as rational
profit maximizers. Moreover, one would expect rational choice theory to dominate
the MBA curricula. Instead, the strategic management texts, one survey found,
provide “precious little support” for the Chicago School’s theory of the firm.103
3. No Unifying Theory
A third criticism is that behavioral economics, while identifying the predictive
shortcomings of neoclassical economic theory, does not provide an alternative
unifying theory to explain human or firm behavior.104 But this criticism
misconstrues the purpose of behavioral economics. Neoclassical economic theory
has supplied an organizing principle, as well as an important level of nuance, by
importing new microeconomic thinking into competition law. The purpose of
behavioral economics is to augment neoclassical economic theory by providing
more realistic assumptions of human behavior. By teaching that humans may
behave “predictably irrationally,”105 behavioral economics provides a mechanism
for policy makers to consider whether and to what extent they should refine
existing frameworks to account for nuances in human behavior.
Behavioral economics does not necessarily call for less or more antitrust
regulation. If anything, it draws into question our reliance on economic theory
when the evidence suggests otherwise. It calls into question our preoccupation with
the cost of false positives (which has taken prominence over the last thirty years)
while not attending to the cost of false negatives. And, as discussed below, it raises
questions about our ability to predict outcomes and optimize efficiency through
antitrust’s rule of reason standard, suggesting that antitrust’s prevailing legal
standard be brought closer to rule of law principles.

102. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: HOW OUR
IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING 39–59 (2010) (exploring how
workers can abide by shared corporate norms, and lose utility when they put in low effort,
and how jobholders, if they have only monetary rewards and only economic goals, “will
game the system insofar as they can get away with it”).
103. Norman W. Hawker, Antitrust Insights from Strategic Management, 47 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 67, 74 (2003).
104. See Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response
to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1577, 1586 (1998) (“[B]ehavioral
economics can better be seen as a series of particular counterstories, formed largely in
parasitic reaction to the unduly self-confident predictions of rational choice theorists, than as
an alternative general theory of human behavior.”); Posner, supra note 77, at 1559–60.
105. ARIELY, supra note 10.
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4. Rule of Law Concerns
Another criticism is that, even if neoclassical economic analysis does not
indicate the correct result in every case, it has promoted greater predictability and
consistency in antitrust analysis.106 The fear is that behavioral economics will
increase the range of outcomes reached in an antitrust case, and thus inject more
unpredictability into competition law.
We are sensitive to this concern. Antitrust law must comport as much as feasible
with rule of law principles. Possible civil or criminal liability should not depend on
the latest economic theory. Neoclassical economic theory has provided a basis for
evaluating antitrust cases, and in some cases, simply stated legal norms. Moreover,
while economic theory has many dialects, it can provide a common language for
competition authorities across the globe.
But neoclassical economic theory has its imperfections. First, as discussed
below, neoclassical theory, because of its dependence on a flawed assumption of
rationality, provides an incomplete, and at times incorrect, account of competition.
Antitrust legal standards that rely on neoclassical theory can lead to high error
costs, thereby undercutting the goals of competition law. Through a more
persuasive and complex theory of rationality, behavioral economics can provide a
superior account of competition, can lead to more empirically based presumptions
in antitrust’s legal standards, and can result in more informed antitrust enforcement.
Second, it is debatable whether neoclassical economic theory’s reliance on the
rule of reason has provided the desired level of administrability, consistency,
objectivity, and transparency to antitrust.107 The Supreme Court’s current rule of
reason standard provides little predictability for market participants, and, in
combination with class action mechanisms, subjects litigants and trial courts to the
purgatory of “sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming” discovery.108 The
Court’s alternative per se standard is also unsatisfactory for evaluating many
ordinary competitive restraints: the risk of false positives counsels against
expanding rules of per se illegality, while the risk of false negatives counsels
against expanding predictability through rules of per se legality.
As Justice Breyer observed in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc.,
“antitrust law cannot, and should not, precisely replicate economists’ (sometimes
conflicting) views.”109 Instead, for legal standards in the antitrust context to serve
their goals of prohibiting anticompetitive conduct while not sweeping in
procompetitive conduct, they must be as precise as possible. The insights from
behavioral economics can facilitate that end by providing agencies, courts, and
legislatures with an additional lens through which to understand the facts before
them. In some contexts, courts will conclude that the rule of reason is the best
option. But, it may also mean that in other contexts, lawmakers will take all of the

106. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Derek W. Moore, The Future of Behavioral Economics in
Antitrust Jurisprudence, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 89, 92 (2010).
107. Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (2009) [hereinafter Stucke, Rule of Reason].
108. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007).
109. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 914–15 (2007) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
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available empirical economic evidence and create legally rebuttable
presumptions.110 As we discuss below, behavioral economics can play an important
role in that endeavor by explaining how actual, real-world evidence that contradicts
(or is unexplainable under) a neoclassical economic theory may nevertheless be
insightful in understanding whether conduct is pro- or anti-competitive.
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY IN ANTITRUST LAW
Although behavioral economics, as Part I discusses, has become a growth stock,
this Part discusses how the assumption of rational, self-interested profit maximizers
became and remains embedded in antitrust policy.
A. The Chicago School’s Assumption of Rationality
When Congress enacted the federal antitrust laws, it neither endorsed the
assumption of a rational profit maximizer, nor dictated the application of any
particular economic theory.111 Congress instead sought to strike a balance between
(i) providing the courts with sufficient latitude to shape those laws over time and
(ii) not giving the courts unfettered discretion to interpret the antitrust laws so as to
advance a particular judge’s ideology.112
For several decades, the Supreme Court utilized a variety of economic
organizing principles in its antitrust jurisprudence.113 Broadly speaking, however,

110. See Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with Optimally
Differentiated Rules Instead of “Per Se Rules vs. Rule of Reason,” 2 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 215, 219 (2006); Alfred E. Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 HARV. L. REV.
28, 41 (1953).
111. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 249
(1985) (“The legislative histories of the various antitrust laws fail to exhibit anything
resembling a dominant concern for economic efficiency.”); George J. Stigler, The
Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 3 (1982) (“A careful
student of the history of economics would have searched long and hard . . . the day the
Sherman Act was signed . . . for any economist who had ever recommended the policy of
actively combatting collusion or monopolization in the economy at large.”).
112. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1997) (noting that Congress
“expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on commonlaw tradition” (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1978))); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (“The Sherman
Act . . . . invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common
law had assigned to the term in 1890.”); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489
(1940) (noting that the “vagueness of [the Sherman Act’s] language” left it to the courts to
give “content to the statute”).
113. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836–1937, at 268
(1991) (“One of the great myths about American antitrust policy is that courts began to adopt
an ‘economic approach’ to antitrust problems only in the 1970’s. At most, this ‘revolution’
in antitrust policy represented a change in economic models. Antitrust policy has been
forged by economic ideology since its inception.”); see also William E. Kovacic & Carl
Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43
(2000) (surveying the role of economics in antitrust since the Sherman Act’s inception).
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in the thirty-year period that preceded the Chicago School’s inception, the Court
sought four aims.114
First, the Court generally (but not always) sought a rule that was administrable
for generalist judges.115 With some notable exceptions, the Court turned to the
Sherman Act’s legislative history or common law precedent as a basis for its
rules.116
Second, the Court sought legal rules to enhance predictability. For example, in
devising the thirty percent presumption for mergers, the Court sought to foster
business autonomy: unless business executives “can assess the legal consequences
of a merger with some confidence, sound business planning is retarded.”117 The
Court’s role was to provide clearer rules on what was civilly (and criminally)
illegal under the Sherman Act.118
Third, the Court sought to prevent the lower courts from being bogged down in
difficult economic problems, such as trade-offs between inter- and intrabrand
competition.119 Neither the courts nor litigants could weigh the reduction of
competition in one area (such as intrabrand competition for Topco private label
products among Topco member supermarkets) versus greater competition in
another area (such as interbrand competition between Topco members’ private
label products and the major supermarkets’ private label goods).120
Fourth, not only was this weighing beyond its competence, the Court recognized
that the legislature, while subject to rent seeking, was more politically accountable
than the judiciary; thus Congress must make these normative trade-offs.121
The Court’s implementation of these principles resulted in a period of
unprecedented victories for antitrust enforcement. The Court used per se tests to
condemn a broad range of conduct including tying arrangements that conditioned
the sale of one product upon the buyer’s agreement to purchase a second product,122
nonprice vertical restraints through which a manufacturer limited its resalers to
specific geographic areas,123 and the adoption of exclusive sales territories by
marketing joint ventures.124 In the merger context, in its 1963 decision in
Philadelphia National Bank, the Court aimed for a presumption consistent with the
congressional concerns in the 1950 Clayton Act amendments to deal with the rising
tide of economic concentration in the American economy. The Court sought a
presumptively anticompetitive post-merger market share that was based on figures

114. See Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 107, at 1401–06.
115. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963) (“[I]n any case in
which it is possible, without doing violence to the congressional objective embodied in [the
statute], to simplify the test of illegality, the courts ought to do so in the interest of sound and
practical judicial administration.”).
116. Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 107, at 1402–03.
117. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362.
118. Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 107, at 1403.
119. Id. at 1404–05.
120. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
121. Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 107, at 1405–06.
122. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958).
123. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 377–79 (1967).
124. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 608–10.
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in its earlier Clayton Act cases and that was also consistent with prevailing
scholarly opinion.125 The Court also, however, placed horizontal mergers that
created market shares below ten percent in question.126
As scholars have noted, “[t]here was considerable consistency between judicial
decisions and economic thinking during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.”127 But that
consistency did not, in the eyes of the Court’s critics, provide the doctrinal certitude
that antitrust law required. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the Chicago School’s
neoclassical economic theories began to serve that role.128
Although the “basic features of the Chicago [S]chool of antitrust analysis are
attributable to the work of Aaron Director in the 1950’s,”129 Robert Bork’s
Antitrust Paradox130 is widely considered to have laid the foundation for the
Chicago School’s incorporation into federal antitrust law.131
Judge Bork argued that contrary to early thinking, the Sherman Act’s legislative
history “displays the clear and exclusive policy intention of promoting consumer
welfare,” a term which Bork gave a different meaning than others.132 As the
Chicago School recognized, defining the goal of antitrust is paramount. This is
because “[e]verything else follows from the answer we give.”133 So to make the
rule of reason “more manageable,” the Chicago School adopted the position “that
the essential spirit of the Rule is to condemn only those practices that are, on
balance, inefficient in the economic sense.”134

125. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365–66 (1963).
126. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 551–52 (1966) (blocking a
merger between two brewing firms that together accounted for twenty-four percent of beer
sales in Wisconsin, eleven percent of sales in a three-state area of the upper Midwest, and
less than five percent of sales nationally, holding that the Clayton Act was violated “in each
and all of these three areas”); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966)
(enjoining a merger between two Los Angeles grocery chains with no more than 7.5 percent
of retail sales).
127. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 51–52.
128. For a detailed discussion of the rise of the Chicago School, see Kovacic & Shapiro,
supra note 113, at 52–55; Stucke, supra note 68, at 539–44.
129. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925, 925 (1979). See generally Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future:
Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281 (1956).
130. BORK, supra note 3.
131. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Abiding Influence of The Antitrust Paradox, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455, 456 (2008) (“Virtually all would agree that the Supreme
Court, in its change of direction of antitrust law beginning in the late 1970s, drew principally
from Judge Bork’s book both for guidance and support of its new consumer welfare basis for
antitrust doctrine.”).
132. BORK, supra note 3, at 61 (arguing that the overriding policy goal behind the
Sherman Act is consumer welfare and that Congress intended to accomplish that goal by
protecting economic efficiency). Bork’s interpretation has been so roundly discredited that
some have called for a halt of its bashing. See Daniel R. Ernst, The New Antitrust History, 35
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 879, 882–83 (1990).
133. BORK, supra note 3, at 50.
134. Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on
the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 16 (1977).
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The Chicago School next elevated the importance of the rationality assumption.
Although Posner once said that the “basic tenet of the Chicago [S]chool [is] that
problems of competition and monopoly should be analyzed using the tools of
general economic theory,”135 economists disagree on what those tools are. So the
Chicago School differentiated itself by starting “from the [strong] assumption that
[market participants] are rational profit maximizers.”136 Adopting this presumption
allowed Chicago School theorists to more easily predict how rational profit
maximizers should act.
A key component in the Chicago School’s thinking is not that rational decision
making leads to perfect decision making, but that markets are self-correcting and
will counteract faulty decision making. Except for the rare cases of price-fixing,
mergers to monopoly, or other sustained market failures,137 government
intervention is often seen as unnecessary and harmful. The Chicago School’s
theories do not treat firm behavior any differently from individuals’ collective
behavior.
As Posner, Federal Trade Commissioner William Kovacic, and others have
noted, it is inaccurate to say that the emphasis modern federal antitrust law has
placed on neoclassical economics is solely attributable to the Chicago School.138
Nevertheless, whether characterized as Chicago, post-Chicago,139 or Harvard140
School theory, antitrust’s economic theories for the past thirty years have largely
assumed that rational profit-maximizing market participants have willpower.

135. Posner, supra note 129, at 933–34.
136. Id. at 928, 933–34 (explaining that neoclassical theories rely on the core theoretical
assumption that individuals are perfectly rational, profit-maximizing decision makers); see
also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 113, at 140 (“As a general proposition business
firms are (or must be assumed to be) profit maximizers . . . .”).
137. See Posner, supra note 129, at 933.
138. See Kovacic, supra note 5, at 29; Posner, supra note 129, at 925 (concluding that,
because of the convergence between the Harvard and Chicago Schools’ thinking, “it is no
longer worth talking about different schools of academic antitrust analysis”); see also Daniel
A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 1918–20
(2009) (book review) (discussing overlap among Chicago, post-Chicago, and Harvard
Schools).
139. The post-Chicago approach, which uses game theory to examine ways in which
established firms behave strategically in comparison to actual and potential rivals, has
supplied a well-developed body of literature that highlights a broader view of predatory
pricing, and predatory and exclusionary behavior more generally. Under the post-Chicago
School theory, firms with substantial market power can engage in exclusionary conduct by
raising their rivals’ cost. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop,
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J.
209 (1986).
140. See Kovacic, supra note 5, at 80 (noting that the Harvard School, through the
contributions of Donald Turner, Phillip Areeda, and Justice Stephen Breyer, “has had as
much to do as Chicago with creating many of the widely-observed presumptions and
precautions that disfavor intervention by U.S. courts and enforcement agencies”); see also
Einer Elhauge, Harvard Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent U.S. Supreme
Court Decisions?, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 59 (2007).
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B. How the Rationality, Profit Maximization, and Efficiency Assumptions
Permeate Modern Federal Antitrust Law
As a result of the Chicago School’s “powerful simplifications,” such as
“rationality, profit maximization, [and] the downward-sloping demand curve,”141
neoclassical economic principles now underlie much of modern federal antitrust
law and pervade the doctrinal analysis that governs sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act as well as merger review.
In the section 1 context, which involves unreasonable restraints of trade, the
Chicago School’s rational choice theories played a central role in the Supreme
Court’s shift from its per se rule to its rule of reason standard.142 In Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,143 the Court overturned United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co.144 and held that nonprice vertical restraints were subject to the rule
of reason. Then in State Oil Co. v. Khan,145 the Court discarded its per se ban on
maximum resale price maintenance agreements. Citing Posner’s Seventh Circuit
decision, Bork’s Antitrust Paradox, and Areeda and Hovenkamp’s treatise, the
Court reasoned that a per se rule was inappropriate where “a considerable body of
scholarship” suggested maximum resale price maintenance agreements were
procompetitive and provided “insufficient economic justification for per se
invalidation” of those agreements.146 More recently, in Leegin,147 the Court
overruled its nearly century-old per se rule against vertical minimum pricefixing.148 The Court again turned to the thinking of the Harvard and Chicago
Schools and cited as authority an amicus brief by several economists to support the
proposition that “authorities in the economics literature suggest the per se rule is
inappropriate, and there is now widespread agreement that resale price maintenance
can have procompetitive effects.”149
The departure from per se rules has its roots in the Chicago School’s belief that
the false negatives (and administrative costs) that result from the Court’s rule of

141. Posner, supra note 129, at 931.
142. See Joshua D. Wright, Overshot the Mark? A Simple Explanation of the Chicago
School’s Influence on Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 1, 7 (2009) (book review)
(“Perhaps the Chicago School’s most important and visible victory has been the assault on
the per se rule of illegality, which, at least for now, exists only in naked price-fixing cases
and, in a weakened form, in tying cases.”).
143. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
144. 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 58 (1977).
145. 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
146. Id. at 15, 18.
147. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
148. Id. at 889–907 (overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220
U.S. 373 (1911)).
149. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 900 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Economists in Support of
Petitioner at 16, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)
(No. 06–480)); see also Elhauge, supra note 140 (arguing that, while the Chicago School
would have advocated for a rule of per se legality in the context of vertical restraints, the
Court’s adoption of the rule of reason demonstrates that the Court followed the teachings of
the Harvard School).
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reason standard are far less significant than the false positives that follow from its
per se rules. False negatives are not a concern if one strongly believes in selfcorrecting markets arising from self-interested rational market participants. Instead,
the greater concern is that government restraints (in the form of per se rules or legal
presumptions of illegality) represent a greater threat to market efficiency.
Nevertheless, while embracing its rule of reason standard, the Court has, more
recently, complained of antitrust’s “interminable litigation,”150 “inevitably costly
and protracted discovery phase,”151 the risk of “frivolous suits,”152 and the
“unusually high risk” of inconsistent results by antitrust courts.153 So the current
Court, like the earlier Warren and Burger Courts, lacks confidence in the
judiciary’s ability to examine difficult economic problems. But rather than provide
more guidance for courts reviewing antitrust violations under section 1, the Court
now requires the lower courts to undertake a complex economic rule of reason
analysis with relatively little concrete guidance.
Put differently, the importation of the neoclassical ideas in construing section 1
has left the Court in an awkward position. On the one hand, the Court has relied on
the Chicago School’s organizing principles to introduce increased complexity in
the law: if neoclassical economic theory suggests bright-line rules are prohibiting
procompetitive conduct, the Court’s response has been to expand the rule of reason.
On the other hand, the Court has resorted to the Chicago School’s principles as a
justification for simplifying antitrust law by placing the upmost weight on
administrability and predictability when creating bright-line rules that essentially
immunize conduct deemed economically irrational.
The Court’s construction of monopolization claims under section 2 likewise has
shifted as a result of the Chicago School’s influence, particularly in the predatory
pricing context where the Court has crafted liability rules that are premised on the
assumption that firms behave rationally. Under neoclassical thinking, predation
claims specifically and attempted monopolization claims generally are highly
unusual in the presence of low entry barriers and rational market participants. For
any attempted monopolization claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that “substantial
barriers to entry protect the market,” and these barriers are “‘significant’ enough to
confer monopoly power.”154 Notwithstanding the firm’s intent to monopolize a
market and its anticompetitive conduct, a court could find that rational profitmaximizing entrants will materialize and rescue the consumer. Similarly, no
rational firm would engage in predation given the difficulty of recouping its
losses.155 This reasoning led Frank Easterbrook in 1981 to opine that “there is no

150. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
414 (2004).
151. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (quoting Asahi Glass Co. v.
Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003)).
152. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 895.
153. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA), LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281 (2007).
154. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 81, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
155. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 3, at 145 (“Any realistic theory of predation recognizes
that the predator as well as his victims will incur losses during the fighting, but such a theory
supposes it may be a rational calculation for the predator to view the losses as an investment
in future monopoly profits (where rivals are to be killed) or in future undisturbed profits
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sufficient reason for antitrust law or the courts to take predation seriously.”156 This
view has largely carried the day at the Supreme Court.157
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,158 for example, the
Court observed a “consensus among” Chicago School “commentators that
predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.”159 The
Court adopted Bork’s view in The Antitrust Paradox that “[a]ny agreement to price
below the competitive level requires the conspirators to forgo profits that free
competition would offer them,” and, as such, “[f]or the investment to be rational,
the conspirators must have a reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of
later monopoly profits, more than the losses suffered.”160
Likewise, in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.161
(which Bork successfully argued), the Court relied on Matsushita and the writings
of various prominent Harvard and Chicago School scholars to declare that conduct
will not amount to predatory pricing unless (i) the alleged scheme involved pricing
below some measure of cost, and (ii) the predator had a rational prospect of
recouping its losses from such below-cost predation.162 Consistent with the wealthmaximizing assumptions that underlie both schools of thought, the Court observed
that “[r]ecoupment is the ultimate object of an unlawful predatory pricing
scheme.”163 Most recently in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood
Lumber Co.,164 the Court applied its Brooke Group test to claims of predatory
bidding. “Without such a reasonable expectation” of recoupment, the Court wrote,
“a rational firm would not willingly suffer definite, short-run losses.”165 Given the
risks in recoupment, a “rational business will rarely make this sacrifice.”166
But the Court’s reliance on rational choice theory in Brooke Group and
Weyerhaeuser is inconsistent with its recoupment requirement. The Court’s
premise is that firms are rational and self-interested. If true, firms ordinarily would
price their products at or above their marginal cost. Rational firms, Bork believed,
would rarely, if ever, incur the substantial losses in pricing below marginal cost,
unless they believed that the future supracompetitive profits, appropriately
discounted, would exceed the immediate losses.167 So if rational, profit-maximizing
firms were pricing below marginal cost, this would reveal their reasonable
expectation of recoupment. Under rational choice theory, the antitrust plaintiff
should recover simply by proving that the defendant’s prices were below marginal

(where rivals are to be disciplined).”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies
and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 (1981).
156. Easterbrook, supra note 155, at 264.
157. See Leslie, supra note 33, at 289–91.
158. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
159. Id. at 589.
160. Id. at 588–89 (citing BORK, supra note 3, at 145).
161. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
162. Id. at 222–24.
163. Id. at 224.
164. 549 U.S. 312 (2007).
165. Id. at 319.
166. Id. at 323.
167. See BORK, supra note 3, at 145.
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cost.168 But the Court requires antitrust plaintiffs to separately prove a reasonable
expectation of recoupment. This second element provides antitrust defendants
another opportunity to avoid liability. Even if pricing below marginal cost,
defendant could argue that entry barriers are sufficiently low, so that rational profit
maximizers would defeat any attempted exercise of market power. If true,
defendant, under rational choice theory, should not have priced below marginal
cost in the first place. Although the Court has not adopted the Chicago School’s
view of per se legality for predatory pricing,169 its rule essentially immunizes
conduct deemed economically irrational.170
Apart from the Sherman Act, the neoclassical economic theories’ rationality
assumption has influenced U.S. merger law. Some described the earlier Merger
Guidelines as “a product of the new economic orientation in antitrust law, if not an
outright product of Chicago School economic theories.”171 These principles can be
seen in two respects.
First, in response to critiques by Bork and others from the Chicago and Harvard
Schools that the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm prohibited mergers

168. One could argue that imposing the second element of recoupment serves to
minimize the costs of false positives from the first element, namely the Court’s attempt in
determining the product’s “appropriate measure of cost.” But if this were driving the Court’s
concern, then it would have specified what constitutes the appropriate measure of cost (such
as average variable cost), which raises its own issues. See Russell Pittman, Who Are You
Calling Irrational? Marginal Costs, Variable Costs, and the Pricing Practices of Firms
(Econ. Analysis Grp., Discussion Paper EAG 09-3, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/248394.pdf.
169. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chicago Schools and the Dominant
Firm, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 109, 110 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008)
(characterizing Brooke Group as a victory for the Harvard School because the Court adopted
the view that predatory pricing could be illegal provided there was an opportunity for
recoupment).
170. The Tenth Circuit noted in the government’s most recent predatory pricing case,
“[r]ecent scholarship has challenged the notion that predatory pricing schemes are
implausible and irrational.” United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir.
2003) (citing Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing:
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2241 (2000) (“[M]odern economic
analysis has developed coherent theories of predation that contravene earlier economic
writing claiming that predatory pricing conduct is irrational.”)). The Tenth Circuit, while
approaching the DOJ’s predatory pricing claims “with caution,” did “not do so with the
incredulity that once prevailed.” AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1115. The DOJ still lost, however.
See id. at 1120–21.
171. Herbert Hovenkamp, Merger Actions for Damages, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 937, 947 n.43
(1984); see also Eleanor M. Fox, Introduction: The 1982 Merger Guidelines: When
Economists Are Kings?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 281, 283 (1983) (“The 1982 Merger Guidelines
. . . . represent a new positivism; a reduction of legal principles to a simple, unitary, quasiscientific, outcome-oriented economic model that, in a generalized sense, has been offered as
the model for solving all antitrust problems. By embodying only one substantive goal—
allocative efficiency—the model offers the appearance of clarity, predictability, and reduced
government intervention.”).
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among small firms that could generate efficiencies, the agencies allowed for a more
fulsome consideration of efficiencies in the 1982 Guidelines.172
Second, consistent with the Court’s decision in General Dynamics,173 the 1982
Guidelines embraced the neoclassical idea that, concentration ratios
notwithstanding, a firm’s market share may not accurately reflect the firm’s longterm competitive viability. Thus, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) serves to
reduce the risk of false positives by creating what are generally viewed as “safe
harbors.” If a merger’s HHI (a measure of the industry concentration that will result
from the merger)174 falls within those safe harbors, the merger is typically not
challenged. On the other hand, high market shares post-merger in highly
concentrated industries are insufficient. The antitrust agencies must still prove a
compelling competitive effects story (namely, how this merger significantly
increases the risk of coordinated or unilateral anticompetitive effects) and why the
exercise of market power will not be squelched by the entry (or expansion) of
rational, profit-maximizing firms.
In short, since the Chicago School’s ascendance in the mid-1970s, antitrust law
has embraced neoclassical principles at every turn. While these principles may have
been motivated by the desire to increase predictability (and, in turn, lead to fewer
false positives), it is not altogether clear that the neoclassical antitrust theories led
to those results. In some cases, the desire to subject conduct to a rule-of-reason
framework, so as not to prohibit procompetitive conduct, decreased predictability.
As discussed below, the behavioral economics literature provides insights into
ways to further sharpen antitrust rules to result in fewer false positives and false
negatives over the long run.
III. HOW CAN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS INFORM ANTITRUST POLICIES?
As the survey in Part II suggests, neoclassical economic theory now covers the
landscape of federal antitrust law. When the antitrust agencies and federal courts
analyze anticompetitive conduct or evaluate a proposed or consummated merger,
they generally apply certain assumptions about firm and individual behavior,
including: (i) markets characterized by low entry barriers do not pose antitrust
concerns—these markets are not susceptible to the prolonged exercise of market
power because rational profit maximizers will enter; (ii) many mergers generate

172. See BORK, supra note 3, at 217. During his tenure as Assistant Attorney General,
Donald Turner of the Harvard School asked Oliver Williamson to study the issue, which
resulted in a paper showing the economic irrationality of merger policy that did not take
efficiencies into account. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). Williamson’s paper, in turn, led to the
inclusion of a narrow efficiencies defense in the first Merger Guidelines, which the 1982
Merger Guidelines revisions more fully embraced and expanded. See also U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § V.A (1982).
173. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
174. HHIs are derived by summing the squares of each competitor’s market share. The
first important variable is the industry’s HHI post-merger. The second important variable is
the change in HHI, namely the number of points by which the merger increases the market’s
HHI. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, § 6.3.
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significant efficiencies; (iii) rational big buyers often thwart the exercise of market
power; and (iv) general deterrence of cartels is achievable under optimal deterrence
theory.
These assumptions—which are based on the tenets of neoclassical economic
theory of plausible behavior—can and do have outcome-determinative effects.
Federal courts regularly grant defendants’ summary judgment motions if plaintiffs’
antitrust claims do not make “economic sense,” such as alleging economically
irrational (non-profit-maximizing) behavior.175 Now Twombly has opened the door
for defendants at the pleading stage to argue that plaintiffs’ antitrust claims are
economically implausible.176 Similarly, “[c]urrent U.S. merger enforcement
policy,” reported the Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC), “is premised on
assumptions about how concentration and other market characteristics (such as ease
of entry) affect competition and market power.”177 The problem the AMC
identified is that the “[e]mpirical evidence gives only limited support for these
assumptions.”178 As one former antitrust official observed, the agencies’ “merger
review process is applied sparingly,” as the “vast majority of transactions”
(approximately ninety-seven percent) “are cleared within the initial waiting
period.”179
This is all to say that assumptions play a critical role in winnowing the types of
conduct that go to discovery and/or trial, as well as the number of mergers that the
antitrust agencies actually review as potentially anticompetitive. If the assumptions
are infirm, then conceivably some of the conduct that is exonerated and the mergers
that are not reviewed may be anticompetitive.
A. Assumption that Rational Profit Maximizers Will Defeat the Exercise of Market
Power in Markets Characterized by Low Entry Barriers
Neoclassical antitrust analysis treats the potential for entry as significant—if not
sometimes dispositive—in determining whether the existing market participants
will exercise market power. The analysis assumes that markets characterized by
low entry barriers are not susceptible to the prolonged exercise of market power

175. See Leslie, supra note 33, at 272 (noting plaintiff’s two-step rationality burden); see
also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 467 (1992) (citing
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 594 n.19, 596–97
(1986) (summary judgment is appropriate where antitrust claim “simply makes no economic
sense”)); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 614 (7th Cir.
1997) (Posner, J.) (arguing that summary judgment for defendants is proper, even if there is
some evidence of an antitrust violation, if plaintiff’s theory makes no economic sense).
176. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
177. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 61–62
(2007) [hereinafter AMC REPORT], available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_
recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf.
178. Id. at 62.
179. Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Merger Review: A Quest for Efficiency, Address to New York State Bar Association
Antitrust Section Annual Meeting (Jan. 25, 2007), available at http://www.justice.
gov/atr/public/speeches/221173.htm.
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because (i) supracompetitive prices will attract rational profit-maximizing firms,
(ii) these new entrants will replenish the lost output, and (iii) as a result of entry,
prices will return closer to marginal cost.180
With the exception of criminal prosecutions of cartels,181 this assumption
pervades the Sherman Act case law. In the section 1 context, courts have observed
that the absence of entry barriers means a predatory pricing conspiracy is
implausible. In Matsushita, plaintiffs argued that they had adduced facts to show a
plausible conspiracy to engage in predatory pricing.182 The Supreme Court,
however, observed that the antitrust plaintiffs “offer no reason to suppose that entry
into the relevant market is especially difficult, yet without barriers to entry it would
presumably be impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended
time.”183
Likewise, in the section 2 context, for Bork and others, monopolies (other than
those protected by the government) are short-term phenomena: the innovator’s
supracompetitive profits serve as bait for imitators, who “first reduce and then
annihilate [the monopolist’s] profit,” which reverts to the competitive mean.184
Innovation attracts imitation, which leads to commoditization. Courts therefore will
frequently analyze whether a firm can attempt to monopolize, or monopolize, a
market by examining the likelihood of entry.185
Entry barriers are also a key factor under the Merger Guidelines. The federal
antitrust agencies lost a series of merger challenges when courts found that easy
entry would deter any anticompetitive effects.186 The agencies thereafter adopted a
more extensive entry provision in their Guidelines, which set forth what the
agencies believe is required: that entry be “timely, likely, and sufficient . . . to deter
or counteract the competitive effects of concern.”187 Merger analysis for the

180. See, e.g., Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.) (noting how “the lower the barriers to entry, and the shorter the
lags of new entry, the less power existing firms have”).
181. The DOJ prosecutors have been successful in preserving the Court’s per se rule on
horizontal price fixing, bid rigging, market or customer allocations, and output reductions. If
executives conspire to fix prices, they are liable even though entry barriers are low or such
behavior is economically irrational.
182. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 577–78 (1986).
183. Id. at 591 n.15.
184. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 89 (1934); see
BORK, supra note 3, at 195–97.
185. See, e.g., Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant in Robinson Patman Act case where plaintiff failed to
show the presence of entry barriers and noting that “the ease or difficulty of entry” is “[t]he
most significant structural factor bearing on the ability to recoup predatory losses through
inflated prices” because “[w]here a market has low barriers to entry, sellers charging
supracompetitive prices will soon attract new competitors”); AD/SAT v. Associated Press,
181 F.3d 216, 229–30 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment for defendant on
attempted monopolization claim and noting that the presence of “low barriers to market
entry” suggested that the defendant would “face significant competition from new entrants”).
186. See AMC REPORT, supra note 177, at 71 n.40.
187. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, § 9.0.
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agencies “generally entails a hypothetical analysis of entry.”188 In markets where
entry theoretically would be timely (that is, occurring in less than two years),
likely, and sufficient in magnitude, character, and scope to deter the exercise of
market power, then the “merger is not likely to enhance market power.”189 For
mergers subject to a Second Request between the years 1996 and 2003, the FTC
stated that it took no enforcement action where its staff concluded that entry would
be timely, likely, and sufficient under the Merger Guidelines criteria.190
When the antitrust agencies believe that entry barriers are sufficiently low to
defeat the exercise of market power post-merger, there is typically no mechanism
to minimize the risk of false negatives. Private parties and state attorneys general
infrequently challenge mergers.191 On the other hand, if the agencies believe that
entry barriers are sufficiently high to enable the exercise of market power,
mechanisms exist to reduce the risk of false positives. The merging parties can seek
to persuade a generalist court (which is less familiar about antitrust issues than the
agencies) that a hypothetical rational entrant would defeat the exercise of market
power. The section 7 case law is consistent with this approach: the merging parties
can use evidence of low entry barriers to successfully rebut any presumption of
anticompetitive harm. “In the absence of significant barriers,” the courts assume, “a
company probably cannot maintain supracompetitive pricing for any length of
time.”192
The problem is that our understanding regarding the impact of ease of entry on
competition is, as the AMC found, “limited.”193 The behavioral literature identifies
two market-entry error types: (i) excess entry (i.e., entry that fails because it is
economically irrational), and (ii) sparse entry (i.e., entry that should but does not

188. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TRANSPARENCY AT THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: THE
HORIZONTAL MERGER REVIEW PROCESS: 1996–2003, at 14 (2005) [hereinafter MERGER
REVIEW PROCESS], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/02/0502economicissues.pdf.
189. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, § 9.0.
190. See MERGER REVIEW PROCESS, supra note 188, at 78 (noting that of the nineteen
cases identified, sixteen were in highly concentrated industries).
191. See Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review:
Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 171–72.
192. United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“The
existence and significance of barriers to entry are frequently, of course, crucial
considerations in a rebuttal analysis.”); see, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479
U.S. 104, 120 n.15 (1986) (recognizing and quoting from Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 591 n.15 (1986), that “without barriers to entry it would
presumably be impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended time”);
United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1990) (“If there are no significant
barriers to entry . . . any attempt to raise prices above the competitive level will lure into the
market new competitors able and willing to offer their commercial goods or personal
services for less.”); United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 983 (2d Cir. 1984)
(easy entry would eliminate any anticompetitive impact of merger in highly concentrated
industry); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 54–55 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding
that ease of entry “can be sufficient to offset the government’s prima facie case of anticompetitiveness”).
193. AMC REPORT, supra note 177, at 62.
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occur because a firm exhibits irrationality in failing to pursue entry).194 Both
categories of market-entry error can cast light on ways in which antitrust law’s
assumptions about entry are imperfect.
Excess Entry. Entry occurs in some industries when it is economically irrational.
Indeed, some industries “see perennially high rates of entry, intense competition,
and high rates of failure.”195 The behavioral economics and behavioral finance
literature offer at least three possible explanations for this tendency.
One explanation is the “optimistic bias.”196 The notion is that when individuals
judge their likelihood of experiencing a good outcome in an event that they have
some control over—obtaining a favorable job, financial security, or a happy
marriage—they overestimate their likelihood of success.197 In contrast, when
individuals estimate the probability that something negative will happen to them—
a car accident from reckless driving, a loss in the stock market, or a divorce—they
underestimate its likelihood.
Economists Camerer and Lovallo have shown that this optimism bias carries
over to entry decision making.198 Their work found that, while participants in a
given market may correctly realize that the average entrant’s profit would be
negative, the individual participants will incorrectly expect that their own profits
will be positive. Moreover, their work found that optimism bias is most pronounced
in situations they describe as “reference group neglect,”199 where the potential
entrant believes it has a particular expertise or skill in the given market—even
where the entrant knows that its competitors believe that they also have a special
skill. There “is more entry . . . when people are betting on their own relative skill
rather than on a random device” and “[t]he more surprising finding is that
overconfidence is even stronger when subjects self-select into the experimental
sessions, knowing their success will depend partly on their skill (and that others
have self-selected too).”200
A second and related explanation is that entrants may be driven by the
desirability bias. Desirability bias (or “wishful thinking”) is the tendency of
individuals to predict favorable outcomes in external events that they have no
control over, but whose outcomes nevertheless implicate their self-perception.201

194. See Don A. Moore, John M. Oesch & Charlene Zietsma, What Competition? Myopic
Self-Focus in Market-Entry Decisions, 18 ORG. SCI. 440, 441 (2007).
195. Id. at 440 (citation omitted).
196. See Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline,
and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 505–08 (2002) (discussing the principle of
overconfidence in the context of entry decision making).
197. Moore et al., supra note 194, at 440–41 (discussing entrepreneurs’ tendency to rely
too heavily on internal and personal qualities, rather than external market factors, when
making decisions).
198. See Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An
Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306 (1999).
199. Id. at 315.
200. Id. at 311, 314.
201. See Robert A. Olsen, Desirability Bias Among Professional Investment Managers:
Some Evidence from Experts, 10 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 65, 65 (1997) (defining
desirability bias as “the tendency to overpredict desirable outcomes and underpredict
unwanted outcomes”); see also Tor, supra note 196, at 508–10, 515–16 (discussing the
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Such errant predictions may occur if entrants (i) overestimate the likelihood that a
market participant (or participants) will fail or (ii) underestimate the likelihood of
events in the economy that will negatively affect their prospects of success. In
terms of antitrust, a party entering a market with low entry barriers could
overestimate the likelihood that it would obtain the financing to succeed over the
long run or underestimate the likelihood that new entrants against whom it will
compete for market share will succeed. As Professor Avishalom Tor, who has
written extensively in the area of behavioral antitrust, has observed, “[e]ntrants who
overestimate their prospects are more likely to fail than entrants who make accurate
average estimates, but their presence also decreases other entrants’ probability of
success and changes the composition of the final cohort of successful entrants.”202
A third and related bias occurs when entrants focus on themselves rather than
understanding competition. One qualitative field study of entrepreneurs found that
those who started their own businesses thought about their personal abilities, but
“rarely mentioned external factors such as the capacity of the market they were
entering or the strength of their competitors.”203 Thus entrants over-enter markets
they perceive as easy for them (such as restaurants), and do not research the
external environment or competition.204
Sparse Entry. At other times, entry does not occur when it is economically
rational. Thus companies can maintain supracompetitive pricing in markets with
low entry barriers. Between 1988 and 1996, the DOJ criminally prosecuted cartels
in dozens of industries that, on the surface, appear to have moderate or low entry
barriers, including turtles, chain link fences, and bicycle retailers.205 Other recent
cartels involved college textbooks,206 packaged ice,207 scrap metal,208 bid rigging at
public real estate foreclosure auctions,209 and retail gasoline and diesel fuel.210 The
behavioral economics literature offers two possible explanations for the absence of
entry in these markets.

application of desirability bias to entry in the antitrust context).
202. Tor, supra note 196, at 531.
203. Moore et al., supra note 194, at 441.
204. Id. at 444.
205. See Stucke, supra note 68, at 565–66 (collecting cases revealing price fixing in
markets that superficially, at least, appear to have moderate or low entry barriers).
206. Indictment, United States v. Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d 896 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (No. IP
03181-CR), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f201500/201507.pdf.
207. Information, United States v. Home City Ice Co., No. 07-CR-140 (S.D. Ohio Nov.
5, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f234200/234205.htm.
208. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Cleveland Scrap Metal Dealer and Owner
Indicted in Antitrust Conspiracy (Feb. 6, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/press_releases/2008/229926.htm (conspiracy involved industrial scrap metal
dealers who generally place collection boxes at manufacturers’ sites to collect scrap metal,
then pick it up, process it, and resell it to customers).
209. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, California Real Estate Executive Pleads Guilty
to Bid Rigging (Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
press_releases/2010/ 257801.htm.
210. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Convenience Store Company and Individual
Charged with Retail Gasoline Price Fixing in Oklahoma (Sept. 19, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/237430.htm.
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One explanation is that, while information is available, individuals do not react
to risk or uncertainty as a rational profit maximizer would. The efficient market
hypothesis, like rational choice theory generally, assumes that so long as
information is publicly available, rational, profit-maximizing traders will enter
financial markets if there are irrational price moves to maintain market
efficiency.211 Thus, under the efficient market hypothesis, stocks are consistently
priced at a “rational” level: stock prices of actively traded companies quickly adjust
to reflect the rational expectations generated by information as it becomes
available.212 As recent events have proven (and as the behavioral finance literature
shows), rational arbitrageurs do not, however, always exploit obvious fiscal
opportunities to restore prices to their fundamental value.213 The behavioral finance
literature also suggests that sparse entry may result from the fact that the
information needed to make a rational decision about entry can be costly to acquire,
process, and verify.214
A second explanation for sparse entry is the flip side of the overconfidence bias:
while people are overconfident with respect to easy tasks, they rate themselves well
below average on difficult tasks. So rates of entry, in one behavioral experiment,
differed dramatically for difficult and simple tasks. In the experiment, participants
over-entered when the quiz was simple (sixty-nine percent of the time), but entered
less often on rounds when the quiz was difficult (thirty-nine percent of the time),
even though they stood to profit in entering the difficult rounds.215 There was no
evidence that the university students learned to avoid these mistakes over twelve
rounds.216 In basing entry largely on their myopic judgment, the participants failed
to see profitable opportunities where less competition existed.
These insights from the behavioral literature suggest that hypothetical entry
barriers are only part of understanding market entry. At times, some businesses
proclaim to the antitrust agencies that they would enter in response to a small but
significant nontransitory increase in price (SSNIP). Accurately predicting an
entrant’s success, however, requires a more complete understanding of the biases

211. See Stucke, supra note 68, at 569–70.
212. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 770–72 (1985) (explaining the
efficient market hypothesis); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos?
Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 646–48
(1995) (describing the concept of the efficient market hypothesis in modern financial
theory); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 554–65 (1984) (detailing principles of market efficiency).
213. For an account of the rise and fall of the efficient market hypothesis, see FOX, supra
note 8.
214. Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 637 (2003) (noting that because information is costly to obtain,
process, and verify, “it is impossible for every participant in securities markets to actually
acquire, understand, and validate all the available information that might be relevant to
valuing securities”); see also Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market
Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455 (2006) (discussing examples where
arbitrage should occur in financial markets, but does not).
215. Moore et al., supra note 194, at 449.
216. Id. at 450.
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that skew the entrant’s wealth maximization calculus. At other times, even if entry
barriers are low, entry will not occur despite the profit opportunity. A more fulsome
entry analysis should therefore consider factors apart from entry barriers, such as:
(i) why entry does not occur in markets when antitrust’s rational choice theory
predicts it would, (ii) why others enter markets when it is economically irrational,
and (iii) what a prospective entrant’s likelihood of success is, in recognition of
possible optimism bias.
B. Assumption that Companies Merge to Generate Significant Efficiencies
Antitrust policy assumes that companies often merge to obtain efficiencies. “All
of us know,” one Bush antitrust official remarked, “that the rationale for most
mergers is procompetitive and that most mergers have no adverse effects on
competition.”217 Some noted that the change from the 1960s is “more than anything
else . . . the perception that many, if not most, mergers are efficiency-enhancing, a
fact that has come to the forefront with the need to permit American firms to be
competitive in international markets.”218 The antitrust agencies believe that “[t]he
vast majority of mergers pose no harm to consumers, and many produce
efficiencies that benefit consumers in the form of lower prices, higher quality goods
or services, or investments in innovation.”219 The belief is that profit-maximizing
firms merge to generate efficiencies and/or to achieve market power. If the merger
generates neither, it is economically irrational.
The Merger Guidelines likewise state that “a primary benefit of mergers to the
economy is their potential to generate significant efficiencies and thus enhance the
merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices,
improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.”220 Although the Merger
Guidelines treat efficiencies as a defense, the merging parties can use efficiencies
to explain why the merger is unlikely to lead to coordinated effects; that is, the
efficiencies will reduce the merged firm’s marginal costs resulting in a “new
maverick firm” that has less incentive to engage in tacit or express collusion.221
Consequently, “[t]he Agencies will not challenge a merger if cognizable

217. William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. of the U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, What Is Competition?, Address Before the Seminar on Convergence (Oct.
28, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200440.htm.
218. Thomas E. Kauper, Merger Control in the United States and the European Union:
Some Observations, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 305, 328 (2000).
219. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES, at v (2006) [hereinafter GUIDELINES COMMENTARY], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm.
220. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, § 10; see also U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.0 (1984) (“[T]he [DOJ] seeks to avoid unnecessary
interference with that larger universe of mergers that are either competitively beneficial or
neutral.”). For a detailed account of the evolution of the efficiencies defense, see William J.
Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into
Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207 (2003).
221. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, § 10.
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efficiencies are of a character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be
anticompetitive in any relevant market.”222
At times, the antitrust agencies reject the merging parties’ efficiencies defense,
and no federal court to date has relied on efficiencies in rejecting the antitrust
agencies’ challenge to an otherwise anticompetitive merger. But efficiencies
continue to play a significant role in the agencies’ merger review. In recent closing
statements, for example, the DOJ highlighted the likely efficiencies from mergers
in the highly concentrated telephone,223 satellite radio,224 airline,225 and home
appliance226 industries. The DOJ noted that “one of the key parts” of its
investigation of a proposed joint venture between two beer companies was having
“verified that the joint venture” between Miller and Coors was “likely to produce
substantial and credible savings that will significantly reduce the companies’ costs
of producing and distributing beer.”227
Recent changes to the Merger Guidelines in 1997 and 2010 emphasize that
“[e]fficiencies are difficult to verify and quantify . . . because much of the
information relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging
firms,” and that, “[m]oreover, efficiencies projected reasonably and in good faith
by the merging firms may not be realized.”228 Indeed, in several notable cases—
AOL/Time Warner and Sony/Columbia Pictures to name a few—the parties poorly
predicted the mergers’ likely efficiencies.229 And if the events in the financial
sector in the fall of 2008 are any indication, in many of the bank mergers that
preceded the financial crisis, the banks failed to sustain their anticipated growths in

222. Id.
223. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement by Assistant Attorney General
Thomas O. Barnett Regarding the Closing of the Investigation of AT&T’s Acquisition of
Bellsouth: Investigation Concludes that Combination Would Not Reduce Competition (Oct.
11, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2006/218904.pdf.
224. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of XM Satellite Radio Holdings
Inc.’s Merger with Sirius Satellite Radio Inc.: Evidence Does Not Establish that
Combination of Satellite Radio Providers Would Substantially Reduce Competition (Mar.
24, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/231467.pdf.
225. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice’s
Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Merger of Delta Air Lines
Inc. and Northwest Airlines Corporation (Oct. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/238849.htm.
226. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Antitrust Division
Statement on the Closing of Its Investigation of Whirlpool’s Acquisition of Maytag (Mar.
29, 2006) [hereinafter Whirlpool Press Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/press_releases/2006/215326.htm.
227. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice’s
Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Joint Venture Between
SABMiller Plc and Molson Coors Brewing Company (June 5, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/233845.htm.
228. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, § 10.
229. See ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL: M&A LESSONS THAT RISE ABOVE THE
ASHES (2005) (summarizing major failed mergers); Tim Arango, How the AOL-Time
Warner Merger Went So Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2010, at B1.
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profit.230 As economist F.M. Scherer observed, “making mergers is a risky
proposition” and many “fail to live up to expectations and may indeed make
matters worse rather than better.”231 For Scherer, “[m]aking mergers is a form of
gambling; skill matters, but there is an important chance component.”232
The unrealized efficiencies in these cases may have resulted from incomplete
information or unanticipated events (such as an economic downturn). However,
these phantom efficiencies may also be the result of the biases discussed in the
behavioral economics literature.
One explanation is that in competitive settings—such as auctions and bidding
wars—passion may trump reason. Rational choice theory assumes that in an
auction, each profit-maximizing bidder assumes that the other bidders are also
rational. In bidding wars (whether for antique furniture or a multi-million-dollar
firm), passion and optimism may prevail, leading participants to overvalue the
purchased assets.
In a recent experiment, neuroscientists and economists combined brain imaging
techniques and behavioral economics research to better understand why individuals
overbid.233 Specifically, they examined whether the fear of losing the social
competition inherent in an auction game causes people to overpay. Members in the
“loss-frame” group were given fifteen dollars at the beginning of each auction
round. If they won the auction for that round, they would get to keep the fifteen
dollars and the payoff from the auction.234 If they lost, they would have to return
the fifteen dollars. Members in the “bonus-frame” group, on the other hand, were
told that if they won that auction round they would get a fifteen-dollar bonus at the
end of the round. Whether one gets fifteen dollars at the beginning or end of the
auction round should not affect a rational player: the winner of each round gets
fifteen extra dollars, the loser gets nothing. Nonetheless, the loss-frame group
members outbid the bonus-frame group members, although both outbid the baseline
group.235
A second possible explanation is that corporate executives suffer from “selfattribution bias,” meaning that (fueled by their successes with prior mergers) they
are overconfident in their management skills and believe that the next merger will
yield similar or greater efficiencies.236 A study of a sample of public acquisitions

230. See Ian Bickerton & Peter Thal Larsen, Global, Universal, Unmanageable? Why
Many Are Wary of Bank Mega-Mergers, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 29, 2007, at 13 (arguing
that the efficiencies from bank mergers remain unproven, and that “[d]espite a decade of
banking mergers, there is no evidence that big banks are any more efficient or profitable than
their smaller rivals”).
231. F.M. Scherer, Some Principles for Post-Chicago Antitrust Analysis, 52 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 5, 18 (2001).
232. Id.
233. Mauricio R. Delgado, Andrew Schotter, Erkut Y. Ozbay & Elizabeth A. Phelps,
Understanding Overbidding: Using the Neural Circuitry of Reward to Design Economic
Auctions, 321 SCIENCE 1849, 1849 (2008); see also THALER, supra note 46, at 50–62
(discussing experimental and field evidence).
234. Delgado et al., supra note 233, at 1851–52.
235. Id. at 1852.
236. Matthew T. Billett & Yiming Qian, Are Overconfident CEOs Born or Made?
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that occurred between 1985 and 2002 found that CEOs who previously engaged in
a successful acquisition appeared to overestimate their role in successful deals,
leading to more deals, even though these subsequent deals are value destructive.237
Moreover, the study found that CEOs tend to engage in stock purchases that reflect
this bias (engaging in more aggressive stock acquisitions prior to each successive
deal).238
In short, antitrust enforcers do not regularly revisit mergers, so it is unclear
whether the claimed efficiencies actually materialize. Thus, one cannot assume that
most mergers are procompetitive. More empirical research is needed to determine
to what extent close-call mergers generate significant efficiencies.239 Such research
may help identify factors of when, and under what circumstances, the claimed
efficiencies will likely occur.
C. Assumption that Rational Big Buyers Will Thwart the Exercise of Market Power
Neoclassical economics assumes that cartels are more unstable with big or
“power buyers.” Big buyers use their purchasing power to negotiate a lower price
by playing one cartel member off the other. If the cartel members stand firm, the
big buyer can take its business to fringe firms outside of the cartel, sponsor a new
entrant by offering non-price perks such as favorable product placement or more
shelf space, or vertically integrate. Knowing this, rational cartel members likely
will defect before the big buyer fulfills its threat. As Posner said,
The concentration of the buying side of a market does inhibit collusion.
The bigger a buyer is, the more easily and lucratively a member of the
cartel can cheat on his fellows; for with a single transaction, he may be
able to increase his sales and hence profits dramatically. But with all
the members thus vying for the large orders of big buyers, the cartel
will erode.240

Evidence of Self-Attribution Bias from Frequent Acquirers, 54 MGMT. SCI. 1037, 1049
(2008).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. For the benefits of verifying the parties’ ex ante efficiency claims after the merger,
see Stucke, supra note 68, at 582–86. See also Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised
United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 222–27 (1992)
(proposing enforcement agencies’ conditional clearance of certain mergers subject to postmerger verification of efficiencies); Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N. Dahdouh, Information
Problems in Merger Decision Making and Their Impact on Development of an Efficiencies
Defense, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 23, 27 n.9 (1993) (suggesting, via analogy to performance
bonding, that merging parties be required to divest important assets if the predicted
efficiencies do not materialize).
240. Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1391 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.). The
court, however, noted that “the role of the third-party payor is not quite that of a large
buyer,” since “as a practical matter Blue Cross could not tell its subscribers in Chattanooga
that it will not reimburse them for any hospital services there because prices are too high.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
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Again, this assumption is important in weighing the costs of false positives and
negatives. It is hard to test the degree to which large, sophisticated buyers reliably
defeat the formation and maintenance of tacit or express collusion. Detecting
cartels is difficult by itself. Determining whether a cartel would have formed but
for the presence of a big buyer is even more difficult. One could study the extent to
which cartels carved out markets with big buyers, but that would not explain how
cartels thrived despite the existence of big buyers.
Support for the power buyer argument has waned in the federal antitrust
agencies.241 But the issue of power buyers still arises in the agencies’ merger
review. In deciding not to challenge Whirlpool Corporation’s acquisition of Maytag
Corporation, for example, the DOJ noted that “the large retailers through which the
majority of these appliances are sold—Sears, Lowe’s, The Home Depot and Best
Buy—have alternatives available to help them resist an attempt by the merged
entity to raise prices.”242
Even when the antitrust agencies believe that power buyers could not defeat the
exercise of market power, a generalist court may disagree. Although some courts
have noted that evidence of power buyers is insufficient to independently rebut a
prima facie case,243 the presence of power buyers remains an important factor in
evaluating whether a merger violates section 7.244
The citric acid cartel is one example. In 1991, a federal district court judge
denied the DOJ’s challenge to Archer-Daniels-Midland’s (ADM) long-term lease

241. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, § 8 (“The Agencies consider
the possibility that powerful buyers may constrain the ability of the merging parties to raise
prices. . . . However, the Agencies do not presume that the presence of powerful buyers
alone forestalls adverse competitive effects flowing from the merger.”).
242. Whirlpool Press Release, supra note 226.
243. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410, 440 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that
“courts have not considered the ‘sophisticated customer’ defense as itself independently
adequate to rebut a prima facie case” and that “the economic argument for even partially
rebutting a presumptive case, because a market is dominated by large buyers, is weak”); FTC
v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 58 (D.D.C. 1998) (“Although the courts have not
yet found that power buyers alone enable a defendant to overcome the government’s
presumption of anti-competitiveness, courts have found that the existence of power buyers
can be considered in their evaluation of an anti-trust case, along with such other factors as
the ease of entry and likely efficiencies.”).
244. See, e.g., FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999)
(questioning the district court’s reliance on the testimony of managed care payers, since
testimony is contrary to their economic interests “and thus is suspect”); United States v.
Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing customers’ ability to “closely
examine available options and typically insist on receiving multiple, confidential bids for
each order” as evidence that they could combat any price increase resulting from the
mergers); United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 670 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Distributors
like Orion have substantial leverage over Syufy and they know it.”); United States v.
Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 694 (D. Minn. 1990) (refusing to enjoin a
merger where three large customers accounted for ninety percent of all purchases in the
relevant product market and crediting the customers’ ability to monitor prices closely and
aggressively challenge potential price increases by seeking alternative sources of supply
outside the relevant geographic market).

2011]

BEHAVIORAL ANTITRUST

1565

agreement with a competitor. The court believed that ADM’s customers were
sufficiently powerful to counteract any non-cost-based price hike.245 The court
observed that ongoing “consolidation of buying power [was] an effective means of
counteracting any potential market power that might be exercised by sellers”—an
observation that was “borne out by both economic theory and the facts.”246 The
court found that the power buyers had used a variety of tactics to obtain low prices
from high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) suppliers, including “playing off suppliers
against one another, swinging volume back and forth among suppliers, disciplining
sellers by cutting them off entirely, successfully insisting on year long or multi-year
tolling agreements, and holding out the threat of inducing a new entrant into HFCS
production.”247 Consequently, “the size and sophistication of buyers” in the
industry was “a powerful ‘other factor’ that strongly mitigates against the
possibility of any attempt by . . . suppliers to raise prices anticompetitively.”248
The DOJ later prosecuted ADM and others for engaging in a cartel relating to
citric acid. As one former DOJ official subsequently noted, it was “particularly
ironic” that the perpetrators and victims of the citric acid cartel [Coca-Cola and
Procter & Gamble] “included some of the very same firms that the district court
found were unlikely to engage in or be vulnerable to cartel activity in refusing to
enjoin an acquisition by ADM of one of its leading rivals in the high fructose corn
syrup market back in 1991.”249 In the ensuing private litigation, Judge Posner,
writing for the Seventh Circuit, rejected the defendants’ argument that the presence
of large buyers (including Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola) as a matter of economic
theory defeated the possibility of price fixing: although these “very large buyers”
drove hard bargains and obtained large discounts from the list price of HFCS, “it
does not follow that the defendants could not and did not fix the price of HFCS
55.”250
Indeed, going down the DOJ’s list of Sherman Act violations yielding a corporate
fine of ten million dollars or more,251 one finds other recent international price-fixing
cartels with big buyers as victims. The lysine cartel—featured in the film The
Informant! (based on a book of the same name)252—is one example. There the world’s
major lysine manufacturers orchestrated an international cartel that caused a seventy
percent price increase in its first nine months. The cartel victims included Tyson Foods

245. See United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400, 1416, 1422
(S.D. Iowa 1991).
246. Id. at 1422.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. of the U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: From Dead Frenchmen to Beautiful
Minds and Mavericks, Address Before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting
(Apr. 24, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ speeches/11050.pdf.
250. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir. 2002).
251. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, SHERMAN ACT VIOLATIONS YIELDING A
CORPORATE FINE OF $10 MILLION OR MORE (Dec. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/sherman10.pdf.
252. THE INFORMANT! (Warner Bros. 2009) (based on KURT EICHENWALD, THE
INFORMANT (2000)).
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(the largest purchaser of lysine in the United States) and ConAgra (whose consumer
brands are found in ninety-seven percent of U.S. households).253 The liquid crystal
display panels cartel254 harmed “some of the largest computer, television and cellular
telephone manufacturers in the world, including Apple, Dell and Motorola.”255 The air
transportation cartel (among the “largest and most far-reaching antitrust conspiracies
ever detected by the Division”)256 affected “thousands of businesses—from the corner
store to the biggest corporation.”257 The Dynamic Random Access Memory cartel
harmed some of the world’s largest manufacturers of personal computers and servers,
including Dell, Compaq, Hewlett-Packard, Apple, IBM, and Gateway.258 The graphite
electrodes conspiracy affected sales to steel mills in the United States and abroad.259
So how should a generalist court respond to the defense that large sophisticated
buyers could readily defeat the exercise of market power? Skeptically. First, in the
context of merger challenges, customer testimony is not always credible. Indeed, in
contrast to the findings in ADM,260 some courts have found that customer testimony
is not probative of the merger’s likely competitive effects, and consider such
testimony to be lacking in foundation261 or biased.262

253. Company Profile, CONAGRAFOODS, http://investor.conagrafoods.com/phoenix.
zhtml?c=202310&p=aboutus.
254. See generally Information, United States v. LG Display Co., No. CR-08-0803
(VRW) (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/
f239300/239375.htm.
255. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, LG, Sharp, Chunghwa Agree to Plead Guilty,
Pay Total of $585 Million in Fines for Participating in LCD Price-Fixing Conspiracies (Nov.
12, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/239349.pdf.
256. Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. of the U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Recent Developments, Trends, and Milestones in the Antitrust Division’s
Criminal Enforcement Program, Address to the 56th Annual Spring Meeting, ABA Section
of Antitrust Law (Mar. 26, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/speeches/232716.pdf.
257. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Major International Airlines Agree to Plead
Guilty and Pay Criminal Fines Totaling More than $500 Million for Fixing Prices on Air
Cargo Rates (June 26, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
press_releases/2008/234435.pdf.
258. See Information, United States v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. CR-05-643 (PJH)
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f212000/
212010.htm.
259. Government’s Rule 11 Memorandum, United States v. SGL Carbon
Aktiengesellschaft, No. CR-99-244 (E.D. Pa. May 4, 1999), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f3800/3824.htm.
260. See United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400, 1416 (S.D.
Iowa 1991).
261. See United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(noting that customer witness speculation about “what they could do in the event of an
anticompetitive price increase . . . . was not backed up by serious analysis that they had
themselves performed or evidence they presented,” and that “[t]here was little, if any,
testimony by these witnesses about what they would or could do or not do to avoid a price
increase” (emphasis in original)).
262. See FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 272 (8th Cir. 1995); see also FTC v. Arch
Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 145–46 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[W]hile the Court does not doubt
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Second, the behavioral economics literature suggests that big buyers (like CEOs
with respect to efficiencies and entry) may be overconfident of their negotiating
prowess to defeat any non-cost-based price hike. As a result, when the antitrust
agencies interview big buyers, those buyers may not accurately project their skill
and power over sellers with market or monopoly power. Additionally, these buyers’
responses might be contingent on how the issue is framed. For example, big buyers
may be genuinely less concerned about protecting their customers (and thereby
resist any non-cost-based wholesale price increase by the merging parties) than
taking sales away from their rivals (and thus willing to accept a supracompetitive
wholesale price, if that price was lower relative to the wholesale prices offered to
their competitor retailers).
Once again, more empirical research is needed to determine under what
circumstances large, sophisticated purchasers have been successful or unsuccessful
in preventing the exercise of market power. In the short run, however, the revisions
to the Merger Guidelines suggest that the agencies are willing to look beyond the
mere fact that a large buyer exists to determine whether that large buyer is actually
in a position to constrain anticompetitive conduct.263
D. Reliance on Optimal Deterrence Theory to Deter Cartels
The DOJ’s criminal antitrust prosecutions are driven more by the facts than
economic theory. But neoclassical economic theory still influences antitrust
policies on optimal penalties. The generally accepted approach under neoclassical
optimal deterrence theory is that a “rational” actor, seeking to maximize profit, will
weigh the magnitude of a likely penalty and the probability of being detected
against the gain from a violation before engaging in anticompetitive conduct.264 To
achieve optimal deterrence, the total penalty levied against a cartel (which includes
civil damages and criminal penalties) should equal the violation’s expected net
harm to others (plus enforcement costs) divided by the probability of detection and
proof of the violation.265 The DOJ, however, unlike some law-and-economics

the sincerity of the anxiety expressed by SPRB customers, the substance of the concern
articulated by the customers is little more than a truism of economics: a decrease in the
number of suppliers may lead to a decrease in the level of competition in the market.”
(emphasis in original)).
263. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, § 8.
264. See INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK WORKING GRP. ON CARTELS, Defining Hard Core
Cartel Conduct, Effective Institutions, Effective Penalties, in BUILDING BLOCKS FOR
EFFECTIVE ANTI-CARTEL REGIMES 53 (2005) [hereinafter ICN WORKING GROUP ON
CARTELS], available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/
doc346.pdf; Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. of the U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement over the Last Two
Decades, Address to the National Institute on White Collar Crime (Feb. 25, 2010), available
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.pdf (“If the potential penalties that can
be imposed upon cartel participants are not perceived as outweighing the potential rewards
of participating in a cartel, then the fine imposed becomes merely part of the cost of doing
business.”).
265. See William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 652, 656, 666–68 (1983).
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scholars,266 believes that corporate (or individual) fines are inadequate to deter
cartels and that the threat of incarceration is needed.
Over the last fifty years, Congress has considerably increased the maximum
monetary criminal penalties and incarceration periods for antitrust violations. When
the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, violations were misdemeanors with a
maximum fine of $5000 and up to one year of incarceration.267 By 1954, however,
the then head of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division observed that “over the years a
precedent has been established: almost never has anyone been committed to jail for
a Sherman Act offense.”268 Congress responded with stiffer criminal penalties in
1955,269 1971,270 1984,271 1990,272 and most recently, 2004.273
Notwithstanding these repeated efforts to adjust the calculation for potential
cartel members, it is hard to tell how well these stiffer criminal penalties are
working.274 On the one hand, some cartels have “carv[ed] out the United States

266. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at
Behavior, 101 J. POL. ECON. 385, 391 (1993); Joseph C. Gallo, Kenneth Dau-Schmidt,
Joseph L. Craycraft & Charles J. Parker, Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement,
1955–1997: An Empirical Study, 17 REV. INDUS. ORG. 75, 101 (2000) (summarizing
concerns in economic literature about incarcerating price fixers); Nuno Garoupa & Daniel
Klerman, Corruption and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions, 24 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 219, 220 (2004).
267. Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1–2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
268. Stanley N. Barnes, Assistant Attorney Gen., Promoting Competition: Current
Antitrust Problems and Policies, Address to the Metropolitan Economic Association (Oct.
25, 1954), in 21 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 982, 984 (1955).
269. Act of July 7, 1955, Pub. L. No. 135, 69 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1958)) (increasing the maximum fine to $50,000). The average fine imposed under the
Sherman Act between 1946 and 1953 was reportedly $2600. Victor H. Kramer, Criminal
Prosecutions for Violations of the Sherman Act: In Search of a Policy, 48 GEO. L.J. 530, 532
n.9 (1960).
270. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1706, 1708
(1974) (increasing the maximum criminal fines to $1,000,000 for corporations and $100,000
for all other persons and making Sherman Act violations felonies with prison terms of up to
three years).
271. Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596, 98 Stat. 3134,
reenacted in Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1279
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2000)) (increasing the maximum criminal fine
for individuals convicted of an antitrust violation to $250,000 and authorizing the agencies to
calculate the maximum fine for corporations or individuals as twice the loss suffered by
victims or twice the gain realized by the offender).
272. Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-588, § 4, 104 Stat. 2879, 2880
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–3 (2004)); see also S. REP. NO. 101-287 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4108 (increasing the maximum criminal fines to
$10,000,000 for corporations and $350,000 for individuals).
273. Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108237, § 215, 118 Stat. 665, 668 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–3 (2006)) (increasing
the maximum fines for corporations to $100 million, the maximum fine for individuals to $1
million, and the maximum incarceration period to ten years).
274. For an argument that the United States has not yet achieved optimal deterrence, see
Stucke, supra note 28.
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from their operations to avoid the risk of criminal sanctions.”275 But despite (i) the
escalating criminal and civil fines in the United States (and abroad), (ii) treble
private civil damages, (iii) longer jail sentences, and (iv) a generous leniency
program, there is no indication that the United States has reached optimal
deterrence.276 Price-fixers continue to make a skewed cost-benefit calculus (if they
are, in fact, engaging in any calculus) that leads them to believe that they are better
off entering a cartel than not.
The behavioral economics literature suggests that situational and dispositional
factors may account for such irrational behavior. Optimal deterrence theory
assumes that financial gains should motivate, and financial penalties should deter,
self-interested rational agents’ behavior. But some executives refrain from pricefixing for ethical concerns, fear of social disapproval from their peers, or other
informal norms.277 Thus, informal norms can have a powerful influence on
behavior. One cannot assume that by criminalizing conduct, policy makers
necessarily inculcate these moral and social concerns.278 In developing the informal
norms against price-fixing by accentuating the conduct’s immoral and unethical
content, policy makers may be able to better deter cartels.279
Another factor is the optimism or overconfidence bias discussed above: just as
individuals overestimate their likelihood of achieving efficiencies or gaining
successful entry, price-fixers may also overvalue their likelihood of escaping
prosecution. Yet another factor is the availability heuristic, under which the
“perceived probability of detection will depend not only on how frequently
offenses are detected but also on how salient or vivid the method of detection is.”280
If potential cartel participants have little exposure to recent prosecutions, they are
apt to undervalue the likelihood of being caught. Some antitrust lawyers therefore
find it highly effective to include in antitrust compliance programs a former
executive involved in a price-fixing scandal.281

275. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, HARD CORE
CARTELS: THIRD REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1998 RECOMMENDATION 27
(2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/1/35863307.pdf.
276. See Stucke, supra note 28, at 264–69; Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust,
2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 470–74 (2006) [hereinafter Stucke, Morality and Antitrust].
277. See Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval
and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325
(1980); Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is
Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1861–62 (2000);
Stucke, supra note 28, at 272–79.
278. See Caron Beaton-Wells & Fiona Haines, Making Cartel Conduct Criminal: A Case
Study of Ambiguity in Controlling Business Behavior, 42 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY
218 (2009).
279. See Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, supra note 276, at 505–23 (discussing how
antitrust agencies can promote moral norms to better deter antitrust crimes).
280. McAdams & Ulen, supra note 16, at 18.
281. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE: PERSPECTIVES AND
RESOURCES FOR CORPORATE COUNSELORS 34 (2005). Besides these dispositional factors, a
host of situational factors also may be at work. See Stucke, supra note 28, at 15–42
(discussing the situational factors and the extent to which they may influence cartel
formation).
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Ultimately the economic model must account for social policies that can
influence the executives’ decision to engage in price-fixing, including the perceived
probability of detection.282 Thus, the optimal means to deter cartels will involve a
pluralism of mechanisms, including criminal and civil penalties, structural means
(improved merger review), and developing informal norms that highlight pricefixing’s ethical and moral implications.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS GOING FORWARD
The behavioral economics literature, as Part III discusses, can help the antitrust
agencies explore which of their assumptions premised on neoclassical theory are
sheltering anticompetitive conduct and increasing the costs of false negatives. This
Part proposes several actions that the agencies can undertake to advance behavioral
antitrust. As a first principle, behavioral economics can instill in antitrust policy
makers the importance of nuance and not being tethered to particular mainstream
modes of thinking when factual reality does not square with economic orthodoxy.
A. To Be Applied Well, Behavioral Antitrust Requires More Empirical Work
Some skeptics will continue to question whether irrational conduct has any
implications for antitrust analysis. But whatever its label, behavioral economics at
its core is empirical. The literature first identifies normative assumptions
underlying the prevalent economic theories; second, empirically tests these
assumptions and considers alternative explanations; and third, uses the anomalies to
create new theories that are further empirically tested.
We believe that behavioral economics identifies enough holes in the simplistic
rationality assumption to fortify the argument for more empirical work in antitrust
policy. One need not be a behavioral economist to agree. Commissioner Kovacic,
among others, has long called for more empirically driven research policies, noting
how
[i]nvestments in knowledge have long-term capital qualities.
Investments in activities—research, workshops, partnerships with
academia—that build knowledge help ensure that the agency stays
abreast of important developments in economic theory, empirical study,
and legal analysis. Among other applications, this knowledge-building
is a crucial element of effective case selection. A superior knowledge
base increases the agency’s ability to attempt more complex and
demanding matters, helps the agency ground its cases in the best
possible conceptual and empirical foundations, and provides assurance

282. ICN WORKING GROUP ON CARTELS, supra note 264, at 54 (recognizing that while the
calculation method of optimal deterrence theory “is widely considered to be correct, there
are some doubts as to its practicability (difficulties of calculation and proof) and some
concerns about the companies’ rights being impaired if other criteria are completely
disregarded in setting the fines”).
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that the agency will not find itself trapped in the wrong analytical
model.283
Competition policy’s greatest failing has been its incomplete understanding of
how competition works in particular markets in particular communities at particular
time periods, and the interplay among private institutions, government institutions,
and informal social, ethical, and moral norms. By undertaking more empirical
research, competition authorities will understand better the competitive dynamics
of particular markets and how legal and informal norms interact to influence
individual behavior and competition generally.
Competition authorities can use many interdisciplinary avenues to improve their
understanding of market dynamics across different industries. This Article
addresses two avenues: post-merger and post-conviction review.284
1. Post-Merger Review
To illustrate the benefits of post-merger review, we will use a merger between
two nearby nonprofit hospitals in California’s Oakland-Alameda County region.285
The state of California sought to enjoin this hospital merger under the federal
antitrust laws. The geographic market definition was crucial.286 The district court
was confronted with the issue of where patients could practicably turn for acute
hospital inpatient services. If one defined the geographic market broadly, then one
would assume that the merged hospitals would face stiff competition from over
twenty hospitals in the San Francisco and East Bay areas. With conflicting
economic expert testimony, the district court not surprisingly followed the
approach by other courts that relied on the Elzinga-Hogarty economic analysis for
defining the relevant geographic market. As the district court stated:
[T]he first prong of the Elzinga-Hogarty test requires a determination of
the merging hospitals’ “service area,” that area from which they attract
their patients. In the second step, two measurements are taken of the
flow of patients into and out of the test market. The Little In From
Outside (“LIFO”) measurement calculates the percentage of patients
who reside inside the test market that are admitted to those hospitals
located within the test market. A LIFO of 100% would indicate that all
hospital admittees who are residents of the test market are admitted to
hospitals located within the test market. The Little Out From Inside
(“LOFI”) measurement calculates the percentage of the test market’s

283. William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good
Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 922 (2009).
284. See Stucke, supra note 68, at 579–91 (discussing in greater detail the need for such
empirically driven research, its benefits, and several possible concerns of these proposals);
Maurice E. Stucke, New Antitrust Realism, GCP: THE ONLINE MAGAZINE FOR GLOBAL
COMPETITION POLICY, Jan. 2009, at 13–16.
285. California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
286. The parties agreed that the relevant product market was “the cluster of services
comprising acute inpatient care,” including the services provided by Kaiser hospitals. Id. at
1119.
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hospitals’ patients who reside in the test market. A LOFI of 100%
would indicate that all hospital patients admitted to hospitals in the test
market are residents of the test market. A LIFO and LOFI of 75% is
considered a weak indication of the existence of a market and a LIFO
and LOFI of 90% is considered a strong indication of a market.287
The plaintiff alleged an Inner East Bay geographic market. Plaintiff’s economic
expert showed that eighty-five percent of all patients admitted to hospitals in the
proposed Inner East Bay market resided in the Inner East Bay; the remaining
fifteen percent of patients resided outside the Inner East Bay.288 Similarly, eightyfive percent of patients who resided in the Inner East Bay were admitted to
hospitals inside this area, while the remaining fifteen percent sought hospital
treatment outside this area.289 The state of California argued that the eighty-five
percent LIFO and LOFI results, along with its other evidence, were sufficient to
prove geographic market.290 The district court disagreed. The state’s eighty-five
percent results failed to meet “the preferred 90% threshold” of LIFO and LOFI
calculations that represent “a strong showing that a market exists.”291
The district court also believed that big buyers (namely the health plans), when
faced with a price increase, had numerous mechanisms to discipline the hospitals.
The merging parties’ hospitals were approximately two and a half miles apart.292
The state of California argued that many patients, because of traffic and loyalty
considerations to their doctors, would be unwilling to travel east through the
Caldecott Tunnel and west across the Bay Bridge to these other hospitals.293 The
court disagreed. The health plan providers could keep hospital prices low by
“steering” patients to lower cost health care providers.294 Hospitals had high fixed
costs in terms of the physical plant, equipment and maintaining a highly skilled
staff, and consequently would be sensitive to such declines in patient volume.295 So
if the hospitals post-merger tried to increase prices for acute inpatient care, then the
rational profit-maximizing health plans would steer enough members away from
the hospitals to defeat the exercise of market power.296 Indeed, the president and
CEO of the second largest health plan in the East Bay downplayed the possibility
of a price increase by the hospitals post-merger, in part due to health plans’ ability
to steer patients to lower cost facilities.297
The district court also expressed greater concern over the costs of false positives
(more so than false negatives), fearing that “‘judicial intervention in a competitive

287. Id. at 1120–21 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
288. Id. at 1121.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1121–22.
291. Id. at 1123.
292. Steven Tenn, The Price Effects of Hospital Mergers: A Case Study of the SutterSummit Transaction 1 (FTC Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 293, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp293.pdf.
293. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. at 1126, 1130–31.
294. Id. at 1130.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1130–32.
297. Id.
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situation can itself upset the balance of market force, bringing about the very ills
the antitrust laws were meant to prevent.’ This appears to have even more force in
an industry, such as healthcare, experiencing significant and profound changes.”298
(The court also held that defendants successfully established a failing company
defense.)299 Accordingly, the district court permitted the merger to go through.
So what happened post-merger? Did the merged hospital try to raise prices at
one or both hospitals? If so, did the powerful health plans, as the defendants argued
and as the health plan CEO and district court predicted, steer customers to the other
Bay Area hospitals and defeat the exercise of market power? Often the antitrust
agencies don’t know the answer to these questions. The competition agencies
devote considerable resources investigating ex ante the merger. The agencies’
lawyers and economists work very hard to predict the merger’s likely competitive
effects. But they often examine only half of the picture, namely the state of
competition several years before the merger. Indeed, the antitrust agencies could
simply abandon hospital mergers where the LIFO and LOFI figures fall below
ninety percent or big buyers could steer patients to other hospitals.
After the FTC, DOJ, and California’s Attorney General lost six straight hospital
merger challenges in the 1990s, the FTC announced its Hospital Merger
Retrospectives Project.300 To better understand hospital competition and the effects
of hospital mergers and to update its prior assumptions about the consequences of
particular transactions and the nature of competitive forces in health care, the FTC
reviewed several consummated hospital mergers, including a retrospective study of
the merger between the Bay Area hospitals.301 The FTC used detailed claims data
from three large health insurers to compare the post-merger price change for the
merging hospitals to a set of control group hospitals.
So what happened post-merger? Not only did prices increase post-merger, but
the price increase was among the largest of any comparable hospital in California.
The merged entity significantly raised prices for one of the merging hospitals,
between 23.2% and 50.4% relative to the control group.302

298. Id. at 1137 (quoting FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1055 (8th Cir.
1999)).
299. Id. at 1133–37.
300. See Deborah Haas-Wilson & Christopher Garmon, Two Hospital Mergers on
Chicago’s North Shore: A Retrospective Study 2 (FTC Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No.
294, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp294.pdf.
301. See Tenn, supra note 292; Aileen Thompson, The Effect of Hospital Mergers on
Inpatient Prices: A Case Study of the New Hanover-Cape Fear Transaction (FTC Bureau of
Econ., Working Paper No. 295, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/
wp295.pdf; see also Haas-Wilson & Garmon, supra note 300.
302. The price increase at the other hospital was not statistically different from the
control group for any of the insurers. Tenn, supra note 292, at 20. One explanation Tenn
provided for this asymmetry was
that as a major provider of hospital services to commercial patients in the
Oakland-Berkeley area, Alta Bates was a significant price constraint on
Summit. However, Summit may have been less of a constraint on Alta Bates’
price since Summit was a relatively minor provider of hospital services to
commercial patients.
Id. at 22.
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But the FTC’s findings raise larger unanswered questions: faced with this steep
price increase, did the health plan providers try to steer patients to other hospitals?
Did patients resist? As for the CEO who confidently predicted his company’s
ability to defeat any price increase, what went wrong?
Rather than continue to rely on empirically unsupported assumptions, now is the
time for the antitrust agencies to review systematically what actually happens postmerger. The agencies should institute specific mechanisms to test empirically the
following key assumptions underlying the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: (i)
anticompetitive effects are likely to occur only in highly concentrated (not
moderately concentrated to unconcentrated) markets; (ii) even in highly
concentrated markets, anticompetitive unilateral or coordinated effects are unlikely,
absent certain economic conditions; (iii) anticompetitive effects are unlikely, absent
high entry barriers; and (iv) many companies merge to generate significant
efficiencies.
First, the federal antitrust agencies should conduct a post-merger analysis of any
merger subject to an extended Second Request review in which the agency: (i) took
no enforcement action; (ii) permitted the merger in part to be consummated
pursuant to a consent decree; or (iii) challenged the merger in court, but lost. The
antitrust agency, two to five years after the merger was consummated, should
examine the state of competition in that industry, including pricing levels and nonprice components such as innovation, productivity, services, and quality, to the
extent observable, and test some of its predictions when it originally reviewed the
merger.
The agencies’ predictions and assumptions are often discussed in the agencies’
internal closing memoranda. When ending a merger investigation, the agencies
typically discuss in the closing memorandum why the merger was unlikely to
substantially lessen competition. The closing memorandum consequently offers
testable predictions (such as whether an entrant or big buyer would defeat the
exercise of market power or consumers would shift to another product or
geographic area) for the subsequent post-merger review.
To mitigate the burden on the agencies and market participants, the agencies can
develop a two-stage post-merger review. In the first stage, the agency staff would
conduct a quick-look review of competition in that industry. The staff would
interview a small but representative sample of industry participants (for example, in
a merger involving household consumer products, the staff would interview buyers
from food, drug, and mass merchandiser retailers) about the status of competition
and request from the merged entity a limited quantity of data, including relevant
price data. If the quick-look review suggests that competition significantly
diminished, the agencies would engage in a more in-depth review and analyze
whether they had predicted correctly.
The agency would report whether other variables, besides the merger, might
explain the increase in prices or reduction in innovation, productivity, services, and
quality. For those companies identified as potential entrants in the original merger
review, the reviewing agency would analyze, based on its interviews with these
identified entrants, why they chose not to enter, or if they did enter, why they were
ineffectual. The reviewing agency would describe which, if any, of the merging
parties’ efficiencies it could verify post-merger, the magnitude of the efficiencies,
and the extent consumers directly benefited from such efficiencies.
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The federal antitrust agencies would also summarize their findings for the
public, and describe annually what specific actions, if any, they are undertaking
with respect to this data, including how they are incorporating the findings from
this data in their merger review.
Second, the Obama administration should request, and Congress should provide,
the DOJ with subpoena authority for non-public information to conduct such postmerger review for its industries. The DOJ’s Antitrust Division appears to be more
limited in conducting such general post-merger review. Its subpoena authority in
civil investigations comes from the Antitrust Civil Process Act,303 which limits an
antitrust investigation to premerger activities or suspected antitrust violations.304
The FTC, in contrast, has broader statutory authority to gather information on the
effects of its enforcement measures.305 This subpoena authority should be
sufficiently broad to enable the DOJ to test (and eliminate) other explanations as to
why competition (which includes important parameters beyond price) increased or
diminished post-merger. The federal antitrust agencies should also coordinate with
other federal agencies in sharing such information, subject to the data producer’s
ability to challenge the dissemination of its commercially sensitive information.
Third, any publicly held company that seeks to rely on an efficiency defense
before the antitrust agencies and/or the courts should be required to publicly report
its claimed efficiencies in its filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission. (If such disclosure would divulge a trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information that would be ordinarily
protected from public disclosure under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), then the antitrust
agencies may excuse the public disclosure of such information.) For each year postmerger (for the period that it claims the efficiencies will be realized), the company
should report the actual amount of efficiencies realized versus the projected
amount. This should temper the company executives from inflating the claimed
efficiencies, and hold them accountable to the shareholders for pursuing a growthby-acquisition strategy, while informing the agencies on those efficiencies for
particular industries that are more likely to be cognizable and substantial.
The FTC’s recent hospital merger retrospectives have been very helpful. But
there does not exist today a built-in mechanism for routine post-merger review
across agencies. Empirically testing and refining the neoclassical economic theories
underlying much of the Merger Guidelines have several benefits. Such empirical
work promotes effective learning by creating feedback about the relation between
the situational conditions and the appropriate response. By instituting a regular and
systematic review of close-call mergers, the agencies reduce the likelihood of false
negatives and positives in merger review, promote more effective antitrust
enforcement, increase transparency of the merger review process, and make
themselves more accountable for their decisions. An empirically driven
competition policy may also temper the claims, which have also increased over the
past quarter century, of partisanship in antitrust enforcement.

303. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311–14 (2006).
304. See 15 U.S.C. § 1311(c).
305. See 15 U.S.C. § 46.
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2. Post-Conviction Review
To better understand why executives engage in price-fixing and to advance the
empirical research on coordinated effects, the agencies should report, two to five
years after prosecuting a cartel, the state of competition in that industry, as
described above. With criminal cartel prosecutions, the DOJ typically seeks fines
and incarceration. Whether these measures were sufficient to restore competition
and deter recidivism should be assessed.
After securing its criminal convictions, the DOJ by itself or through a pilot
program with social scientists should interview the price-fixers and publicly report
the following: How were the cartels (including those with many members) formed
and enforced? Did they act as many profit-maximizer game theories predict, or
were they more trusting and cooperative than these theories’ predicted
outcomes?306 If so, why? As the number of conspirators increased, were there other
specific factors that enabled them to collude? Why did certain companies
repeatedly violate the antitrust laws? What steps did the company take after its
earlier conviction to increase antitrust compliance, and why were they
unsuccessful?
The DOJ also should make available a computerized database identifying all
civil and criminal antitrust consent decrees, pleas, or litigated actions involving
cartel activity under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The database should include
certain industry characteristics, such as: (i) the number of conspirators (and best
estimate of their market shares); (ii) the length of conspiracy; (iii) the product or
services market in which collusion occurred; (iv) the number of competitors (and
their market share) who were not formerly alleged to be part of the conspiracy; (v)
the number of entrants (and their market shares) during the period of the
conspiracy; and (vi) the nature of the conspiracy.307 This data can help those in
academia, private practice, and the antitrust agencies to better understand collusion
and further develop screening mechanisms to identify industries more susceptible
to collusion.308
One cannot assume that such empirical testing and learning will arise
independently within competition policy. The Supreme Court and lower courts
cannot undertake such empirical testing, as their view is limited to the evidence the
parties supply. Nor can academia and the private bar fulfill this mission. Compiling
such data can often be costly, and the data may be nonpublic. In undertaking this

306. For a comprehensive examination of how cartels facilitate trust, see Christopher R.
Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515 (2004).
307. Keeping the data consistent can be difficult. Market definition at times is
problematic. Identifying conspirators may depend on the sufficiency of evidence and burden
of proof, which differs in the civil and criminal contexts. Other firms could have been
involved in the conspiracy, but the evidence was insufficient to prosecute. The criteria
should be whether a criminal or civil complaint was brought against the firm (and whether
the matter was criminal or civil). Granted, the data at times may underreport the number of
firms involved in the cartel, but having data with such caveats is better than no data.
308. Rosa Abrantes-Metz & Patrick Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies and Their Multiple
Applications, ANTITRUST, Fall 2009, at 66 (describing screening mechanisms to detect
cartels).
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empirical testing and learning, the competition authorities can enrich the
marketplace of ideas. The data lowers the search costs for academics and increases
transparency.
B. Possibilities for Incorporating Behavioral Economics into
Existing Antitrust Doctrine
Besides the empirical evidence needed to improve the predictive capabilities of
antitrust’s economic theories, is there a role for behavioral economics to play in
antitrust analysis? Even with further empirical work, behavioral economics may not
ultimately supply a single organizing principle. It is unlikely that behavioral
economics will yield a single concentration measure (like the HHI) to predict
which mergers may substantially lessen competition. Nor will behavioral
economics offer a rule at a broad level of generality that dictates when unilateral
conduct crosses the debated lines from beneficial to benign to anticompetitive.
But this is no reason to ignore the behavioral economics literature. Life is
messier than the Chicago School’s unifying vision of self-correcting markets filled
with rational profit-maximizing agents that pursue their economic self-interest.
Relying on market fundamentalism only will lead to future market crises and
government bailouts. Along the way to the next financial crisis, there will be cases
where the Chicago School’s rigid assumptions (which, in turn, supply the model’s
predictive capabilities) fail to explain or predict the market behavior. Behavioral
economics can better explain behavior that the Chicago School ignores or
marginalizes.
So even without additional empirical work, behavioral economics may play a
role in the agencies’ analysis in (i) instructing the courts and agencies to reevaluate
hard cases where, on the one hand, neoclassical analysis suggests that the conduct
is not or should not be anticompetitive, but sufficient evidence suggests the
contrary; (ii) informing the competition agencies whether they are indeed fulfilling
their mission; and (iii) providing insights into possible applications of section 5 of
the FTC Act.
1. Use of “Real World” Evidence That Is Not Explainable
by Neoclassical Economic Theory
At times neoclassical economic theory cannot easily be reconciled with
evidence of the parties’ behavior, intent, motives, or post-merger plans.309 In some
instances, economic theory suggests an oligopoly’s ability to tacitly collude (for
example, to successfully implement a predatory pricing scheme) is impossible,
despite the evidence of anticompetitive intent and the fact that the companies for
forty to fifty years were able to raise prices twice annually like clockwork.310

309. See Leslie, supra note 33, at 318–38 (discussing evidence of antitrust violations,
which were implausible under neoclassical economic theory, for predatory pricing, pricefixing, group boycotts of suppliers, and a conspiracy to conceal an invalid patent).
310. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 257
(1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In other instances, the Chicago School’s economic theories suggest that, absent
interbrand market power, a manufacturer cannot raise the price for its aftermarket
parts or services. Rational consumers considering the purchase of the equipment
“will inevitably factor into [their] purchasing decision the expected cost of
aftermarket support.”311 As the Court’s Kodak decision reflects, economic theory
may be inconsistent with economic reality, with evidence of increased prices and
excluded competition.312 The Chicago School’s beliefs, some skeptics may say,
were raised in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Kodak. But it is questionable whether the
current Court would reach the same outcome in Kodak, especially if they, like
Professor Hovenkamp and Justice Scalia, “believe that markets generally work well
when left alone, [and] intervention is justified only in the relatively few cases
where the judiciary can fix the problem more reliably, more cheaply, or more
quickly than the market can fix itself.”313
Chairman Leibowitz’s and Commissioner Rosch’s concurring statements in the
Ovation case314 provide another illustration of the extent to which documents
reflecting the parties’ intentions and incentives can affect merger analysis.315
Ovation Pharmaceuticals, Inc. acquired two drugs to treat patent ductus
arteriosus (PDA), a serious congenital heart defect in newborns. First, Ovation
acquired from Merck the drug Indocin.316 Several months later, Ovation acquired

311. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 495 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
312. In Kodak, the district court permitted truncated discovery and thereafter granted
summary judgment for the defendant. There was no evidence that higher service prices did
(or would likely) lead to a disastrous drop in Kodak’s equipment sales. Kodak’s service
prices increased. But there was no evidence of Kodak’s equipment sales decreasing as a
result. Contrary to Kodak’s theoretical claim, there was no evidence that Kodak actually
priced its equipment at below-market prices and its services at supra-competitive prices for
an overall competitive price. Also contrary to defendant’s theoretical claim, the information
costs were significant. Customers had to inform themselves of the total cost at the time of
purchase. Such accurate lifecycle pricing of complex, durable equipment is difficult, costly,
and customer-specific. Contrary to defendant’s theoretical claim, there was no evidence that
Kodak’s competitors necessarily provided this lifecycle information. Such information was
costly for competitors to obtain, and even if Kodak’s competitors had the lifecycle
information, it may have been more profitable for the competitors to follow Kodak’s lead
and reap supra-competitive prices in their own service and parts market. See id. at 474 n.21.
313. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 124
(2005).
314. We refer to this case as “Ovation” since the actions stemmed from Ovation
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. In March 2009, H. Lundbeck A/S acquired Ovation Pharmaceuticals
and renamed it Lundbeck. Accordingly, the ensuing federal court litigation bears Lundbeck’s
name. FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., Civil Nos. 08-6379 (JNE/JJG), 08-6381 (JNE/JJG), 2010 WL
3810015 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010).
315. Concurring Statement of Comm’r Jon Leibowitz, FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc. (F.T.C.
Dec. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Leibowitz Concurrence], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
caselist/0810156/081216ovationleibowitzstmt.pdf; Concurring Statement of Comm’r J.
Thomas Rosch, FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc. (F.T.C. Dec. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Rosch
Concurrence],
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0810156/081216
ovationroschstmt.pdf.
316. Complaint, FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., Nos. 08-6379 (JNE/JJG) and 08-6381
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from Abbott Laboratories the U.S. rights to the drug NeoProfen.317 After acquiring
NeoProfen, Ovation raised the price it charged hospitals for Indocin by nearly 1300
percent.318 In December 2008, the FTC challenged under section 7 of the Clayton
Act Ovation’s acquisition of NeoProfen as a merger to monopoly in a market for
drugs used to treat PDA.319 Although Commissioner Rosch voted in favor of the
section 7 challenge, he argued in his concurrence that Ovation’s earlier acquisition
of Indocin was also subject to challenge under section 7.320
Here again the actual evidence is hard to reconcile with the Chicago School’s
neoclassical economic theories. Specifically, Indocin for many years was the only
FDA-approved pharmaceutical treatment for PDA.321 Given Indocin’s market
position, Merck (its original owner) could have charged a monopoly price for its
drug. Indeed, under the Court’s dicta in Trinko, Merck’s charging a monopoly price
would serve “an important element of the free-market system,” in that monopoly
pricing serves as an inducement to “attract[] ‘business acumen’ in the first place”
and engage in “risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth.”322
So one is left with two monopolists, each presumably a rational profit
maximizer, choosing dramatically different pricing policies for a patented drug.
Why didn’t Merck, a large sophisticated company, sell Indocin at the monopoly
price (under thirty dollars per vial at the time of the acquisition)? Perhaps
reputational effects, said Commissioner Rosch. If Merck sold a product used to
treat premature babies at a monopoly price, “that could damage its reputation and
its sales of those more profitable products.”323 It could also be that ethics and
conscience had an impact on Merck’s pricing decision. But in a world of rational
profit maximizers, consumers would applaud, not condemn, Merck. Charging
parents whose babies were born with this potentially life-threatening congenital
heart defect the monopoly price would signal others to invest in such innovative
drugs. Instead, reality suggests that consumers and Chicago School economists
differ at times in their perception of what is fair.324
But, in Commissioner Rosch’s view, that dynamic changed when Ovation
acquired Indocin from Merck. Commissioner Rosch found “reason to believe that
the sale of Indocin to Ovation had the effect of eliminating the reputational
constraints on Merck that had existed prior to the sale.”325 Specifically, Ovation
lacked Merck’s “large product portfolio,” so Ovation “arguably was not concerned,
as Merck had been, that the sale of Indocin at a monopoly price would damage its

(JNE/JJG), 2010 WL 3810015, ¶ 1 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Ovation
Complaint], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0810156/081216ovationcmpt.pdf.
317. Id.
318. Id. ¶ 3.
319. Id.
320. Rosch Concurrence, supra note 315, at 1.
321. Ovation Complaint, supra note 316, ¶ 17.
322. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004).
323. Rosch Concurrence, supra note 315, at 1.
324. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness as a
Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 252, 264.
325. Rosch Concurrence, supra note 315, at 1.
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reputation and sales of more profitable products.”326 Thus, Commissioner Rosch
reasoned that, because Merck did not charge a monopoly price for its drug used to
treat premature babies, Merck “arguably would not have the incentive to acquire
another treatment that might prevent it from pricing Indocin at a monopoly
price.”327 Because there was evidence that the transaction substituted “Ovation, a
firm that had an incentive to protect its ability to engage in monopoly pricing, for
Merck, which lacked the same incentive” and that “Merck had no incentive to
acquire NeoProfen, but Ovation had an incentive to do so in order to maintain its
monopoly pricing in the PDA market,” Commissioner Rosch, joined by Chairman
Leibowitz, stated that he would have challenged Ovation’s first acquisition as
well.328 A district court judge has since dismissed the FTC’s and Minnesota’s
claims on the grounds of market definition, and the case is now before the Eighth
Circuit.329
More generally, it may be the case that behavioral economics finds its best fit in
merger review, which is perhaps the closest antitrust enforcers come to engaging in
a traditional regulatory process.330 The expert agencies rely on a routine (including
the presumptions discussed in Part III) to winnow their review of thousands of
merger filings to a small percentage. For these mergers, the agencies engage in
highly fact-specific inquiries; their conclusions in the form of closing statements
and/or a consent decree are case specific and do not constitute binding precedent;
and the review of the proposed merger is done ex ante rather than ex post.
The merger review process offers the agencies the benefit of an extensive factual
record, including investigational submissions of the parties, interviews with
customers and competitors, and the parties’ documents. At times, neoclassical
theory cannot explain the evidence of the merging parties’ behavior, intent,
motives, or post-merger plans. In this vein, the recent changes to the Merger
Guidelines open the door for greater consideration of “direct evidence” of the type
that Chairman Leibowitz and Commissioner Rosch credited in Ovation. The

326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.; Leibowitz Concurrence, supra note 315, at 1 (noting that Merck kept prices low,
“perhaps because it was worried that a significant price increase would have harmed its
reputation” and that “[f]or that reason, I would have supported the approach proposed by
Commissioner Rosch”); see also Interview with J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Federal
Trade Commission, ANTITRUST, Spring 2009, at 32, 40, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/090126abainterview.pdf (noting that the Ovation
statement involved “the notion that economic theory should increasingly focus on incentives
rather than on market structure”).
329. See FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., Nos. 08-6379 (JNE/JJG) and 08-6381 (JNE/JJG), 2010
WL 3810015 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010).
330. See AMC REPORT, supra note 177, at 51 (noting how merger enforcement “has
shifted in emphasis from a litigation-based system focused on judicial review of
consummated deals to an administrative regime in which [FTC and DOJ] review mergers
above a certain size prior to consummation”); Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by
Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1400
(1998) (discussing the shift from a prosecutorial to regulatory antitrust model and, with
regard to HSR merger review, how “regulation and administrative law-making have replaced
the courts as the source for the creation and enforcement of antitrust law”).
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revised Merger Guidelines, for example, explain that merger review is a “factspecific process through which the Agencies . . . apply a range of analytical tools to
the reasonably available and reliable evidence to evaluate competitive concerns”331
and will evaluate “several categories and sources of evidence,”332 including the
parties’ documents and testimony.333 And unlike the prior Guidelines, the revised
Merger Guidelines enumerate several categories of such direct evidence.
The fact that the Guidelines now explicitly recognize that such evidence is
entitled to weight on par with economic modeling may provide both the agencies,
as well as the parties, with a structure for evaluating evidence in light of the
insights that behavioral economics offers. As Commissioner Rosch has observed,
this, in turn, could allow the agencies to more carefully scrutinize the close cases
that neoclassical thinking predicts should be procompetitive or competitively
neutral, but where actual evidence of how the firms do and will behave show
otherwise.334 Behavioral economics thus can fill in the analysis and explain the
real-world evidence when neoclassical economic theory cannot.
2. A Better-Informed Competition Advocate
The federal antitrust agencies are well suited to consider how the behavioral
economics literature can inform antitrust analysis.
First, at a macro institutional level, the agencies can draw on the behavioral
insights they have gained outside of federal civil antitrust law to better inform their
competition missions. To this end, the DOJ can use its expertise in prosecuting
white-collar crimes generally (and price-fixing conspiracies in particular) to inquire
why executives, with so much to lose, fix prices, and why cartels are more durable
and their members more trustful than neoclassical economic theory predicts.
Similarly, the FTC can marry insights gained from its Bureau of Consumer
Protection about the types of conduct that are likely to deceive consumers, with
insights from its Bureau of Economics about when such deception harms
competition (as opposed to individual harm that does not significantly impair
competition). The alleged competitive harm in several recent Commission cases—
N-Data,335 Rambus,336 and Intel337—was premised, in part, on deception. More
generally, the FTC can explore ways that it can bring its consumer protection
mission in line with a goal of creating and preserving consumer choice (as opposed
to narrowly focusing on seller behavior through mandated disclosures or antifraud

331. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, § 1.0.
332. Id. § 2.0.
333. See id. §§ 2.1.1, 2.2.
334. Rosch, Managing Irrationality, supra note 26, at 9.
335. Complaint, In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC (F.T.C. Sept. 22, 2008) (No. C4234), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080923ndscomplaint.pdf.
336. In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/060802commissionopinion.pdf, rev’d, 522 F.3d 456,
468 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
337. Complaint, In re Intel Corp. (F.T.C. Dec. 16, 2009) (No. 9341), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf.
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laws).338 A goal of protecting consumer choice requires enacting policies that, from
the consumer’s perspective, remove barriers to optimal decision making; removing
those barriers, in turn, depends on analyzing how consumers make decisions in the
first place. Moreover, a focus on consumer choice is broad enough to encompass
the insights from the FTC’s ongoing studies into behavioral economics, but not so
broad as to necessarily displace the neoclassical emphasis on providing consumers
with full decision-making authority.
Second, the FTC and DOJ have developed substantive areas of expertise in
certain complex and important industries, including defense, media, healthcare,
petroleum, and pharmaceuticals. At times, the agencies will observe behavior in
these industries that often leads to anticompetitive effects—even though rational
choice theory may predict otherwise. The agencies can challenge these practices as
presumptively illegal under a truncated rule-of-reason/“inherently suspect”
analysis.339 The FTC, in particular, has recently signaled an interest in applying the
“inherently suspect” test to specific practices.340 This framework would reduce the
cost of error under the Court’s per se rule, without imposing the high litigation
costs and risk of false positives and negatives under the rule of reason.341
Third, from a procedural standpoint, the DOJ and FTC also have the benefit of
an extensive investigational process that allows them to evaluate on the basis of the
parties’ documents, investigational hearings, and economic analysis, whether and
to what extent harm to competition is occurring. In post-merger reviews, for
example, the agencies can investigate whether rational profit maximizers did
indeed enter the markets (and if not why not). Private antitrust plaintiffs typically
do not possess such extensive information, which at times is non-public and costly
to collect. Moreover, when it so chooses, the FTC can pursue administrative
litigation and issue a ruling in the first instance that not only has the force of law

338. See, e.g., Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice”
Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (2007).
339. See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); N. Tex. Specialty
Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 370 (5th Cir. 2008); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416
F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
340. See, e.g., Realcomp II Ltd., No. 9320, slip op. at 39 (F.T.C. Oct. 30, 2009),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9320/091102realcompopinion.pdf (finding
certain practices of multistate listing service were “inherently suspect” and that the plaintiff
did not come forward with evidence to carry its burden and explain why those practices
should be legal), aff’d, 635 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2011). See generally Geoffrey D. Oliver, Of
Tenors, Real Estate Brokers and Golf Clubs: A Quick Look at Truncated Rule of Reason
Analysis, ANTITRUST, Spring 2010, at 40 (providing overview of “inherently suspect”
analysis).
341. As Professors Tor and Rinner’s recent work on behavioral antitrust shows,
executives may engage in resale price maintenance (RPM) when doing so is irrational. See
Tor & Rinner, supra note 28. Before Leegin and Sylvania, manufacturers were unlikely to
swim the narrow channel of Colgate unless they had a compelling procompetitive
justification for their action. Thus, one benefit of moving RPM’s legal standard from rule-ofreason to a quick-look standard is that the presumption of illegality would require executives
to evaluate more closely (and justify to their counsel) why they want to institute RPM, and
be able to substantiate why the procompetitive benefits actually outweigh the
anticompetitive effects.
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(subject to federal appellate review), but also provides a roadmap for federal
appellate courts to consider in their review.
Fourth, from a policy standpoint, the DOJ and FTC can regularly assess whether
the agency remedies are indeed effective—a process that the FTC has engaged with
on both the antitrust342 and consumer protection sides.343 Other agencies at times
seek to promulgate rules to protect the consumer that are anticompetitive. At times,
firms compete to exploit or help bounded rational consumers. Distinguishing
between the two can be challenging. So the federal antitrust agencies, by
understanding behavioral economics, can better understand when firms are
providing consumers commitment devices to deal with their bounded willpower
(Christmas savings club accounts, for example) or competing in better ways to
simply exploit them. Antitrust authorities can offer a more nuanced and powerful
message that accounts for consumers’ interest and protects competition than overly
simplistic assumptions that “big is bad,” or that humans behave as rational selfinterested consumers with perfect willpower.
3. Providing Insights into Possible Applications of Section 5 of the FTC Act
Behavioral economics can inform the FTC’s application of its section 5
authority, which prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition” and “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices.”344 Although the FTC routinely uses its section 5
authority in the consumer protection context, it has also applied its stand-alone
section 5 authority in the antitrust context345 (although the scope of the FTC’s
section 5 authority in that context remains the subject of much debate).
In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., the Supreme Court stated that section 5
empowers the FTC to “define and proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even
though the practice does not infringe either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust

342. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE PROCESS
(1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf.
343. A good example of such work occurred when the FTC’s Bureau of Economics staff
released a study showing that the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD)
proposed broker compensation disclosures confused consumers, leading many of them to
choose loans that were more expensive. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF ECON., THE
EFFECT OF MORTGAGE BROKER COMPENSATION DISCLOSURES ON CONSUMERS AND
COMPETITION: A CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2004/01/030123mortgagesummary.pdf. The FTC recommended that HUD should modify
the mandated disclosures and encourage customers to engage in educated comparison
shopping on loan costs. In so doing, the FTC melded behavioral economics and neoclassical
economics, by using insights it had gained from studies of consumer behavior to suggest
ways HUD could more effectively arm consumers with information that they were likely to
credit in ways that were consistent with their self-interest.
344. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
345. See, e.g., Complaint, In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC (F.T.C. Jan. 23, 2008)
(No. C-4234), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080923ndscomplaint.pdf
(alleging a pure section 5 violation in standard setting context); Complaint, In re Valassis
Comm., Inc. (F.T.C. Apr. 19, 2006) (No. C-4160), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
caselist/0510008/0510008c4160ValassisComplaint.pdf (alleging a pure section 5 violation
under an invitation to collude theory).
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laws” and to “proscribe practices as unfair or deceptive in their effect upon
consumers.”346 Besides this broad statement, the Court has provided little guidance
on section 5’s scope or application. Congress amended the FTC Act in 1994 to
incorporate the consumer injury test, which the FTC had earlier adopted.347
Although the codification provided guidance on what is unfair, the Commission,
academics, and practitioners are still sorting through what types of conduct section
5 might cover.348
In the context of those debates, three of the current Federal Trade
Commissioners have observed that, because the Supreme Court has contracted the
reach of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, using section 5 of the FTC Act might
be justified in those cases where anticompetitive conduct is occurring, but where
the current antitrust doctrine does not supply a cause of action.349 The FTC is
uniquely positioned to draw on the behavioral economics literature in these
circumstances. As Susan Creighton, former FTC Commissioner Tom Leary, and
others have suggested, “[p]erhaps the least controversial application of a standalone Section 5 claim should be its use in ‘frontier’ settings, where it is as an
avenue for redressing anticompetitive acts or practices that have newly emerged
and have not yet been fully absorbed into the fabric of the Sherman or Clayton
acts.”350 In these cases, the behavioral economics literature may better explain than
neoclassical theory why harm is occurring. So rather than try to jam a square peg
(the evidence of anticompetitive effects and purpose) in the round hole (the current
neoclassical economic theory underpinning the Clayton and Sherman Acts case
law), section 5 may provide a more logical home for initially bringing such frontier
cases.

346. 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972).
347. Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. 103-312, 108 Stat.
1691, § 9 (1994) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006)).
348. 2 DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW
§ 9:7, at 50–51 (2009–2010 ed. 2009).
349. See, e.g., Concurring and Dissenting Statement of Comm’r J. Thomas Rosch, In re
Intel Corp., No. 9341 (F.T.C. Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
adjpro/d9341/091216intelstatement.pdf; William E. Kovacic, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The
Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, Address to ABA Fall Forum
(Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/kovacic/091112abaforum.pdf
(slides accompanying speech) (discussing the retrenchment of the Sherman Act and Clayton
Act by the Supreme Court from 1975 to the present as a possible justification for using
section 5); Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, “Tales from the Crypt”: Episodes
’08 and ’09: The Return of Section 5, Remarks to Workshop on Section 5 of the FTC Act
(Oct. 17, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/docs/jleibowitz.pdf.
350. Susan A. Creighton & Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati, Some Thoughts About the Scope of Section 5, Remarks to Workshop on Section 5 of
the FTC Act (Oct. 17, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/
docs/screighton.pdf; see also Thomas B. Leary, Of Counsel, Hogan & Hartson, LLP, A
Suggestion for the Revival of Section 5, Address to Workshop on Section 5 of the FTC Act
(Oct. 17, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/docs/tleary.pdf
(“[R]eliance on Section 5 might be most useful in cases where the Commission does, in fact,
have reason to believe that there has been a violation of the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act,
but where there is not yet an established body of precedent to support that view.”).
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Behavioral economics, of course, does not arm an antitrust enforcer or court
with unfettered discretion. Any governmental action must be sufficiently
predictable, objective, and transparent under rule-of-law principles. When the FTC
relies on behavioral economics in the context of section 5, several safeguards are
already in place. First, the FTC lacks authority to impose criminal penalties, seek
treble monetary damages or obtain retrospective relief under section 5. Second,
private plaintiffs cannot bring in federal court follow-on treble damage class
actions for section 5 violations.351 Third, the FTC’s decisions are subject to review
by the federal appellate court of the respondent’s choosing, as well as the Supreme
Court. Indeed, when the Commission last used section 5 in the early 1980s, its
findings of liability were struck down in a trio of federal appellate decisions, which
found, among other things, that the Commission failed to establish predictable rules
and legally cognizable anticompetitive effects.352 By all indications, the Roberts
Court will impose these same requirements.353
But as an added safeguard for novel cases, the FTC should use behavioral
economics to explain strong evidence of both anticompetitive purpose and effects.
If corporate executives engage in conduct with the purpose and actual effect of
harming competition, then it makes little sense to immunize such anticompetitive
conduct because it is unexplainable under the Chicago School’s neoclassical
economic theories.
CONCLUSION
Competition policy is entering a new age. Interest in antitrust law has increased
worldwide, and the United States no longer holds a monopoly on competition
policy. The question for competition authorities is whether and to what extent do
bounded rationality, self-interest, and willpower matter.
Courts and agencies will continue to rely on the assumption of rational, selfinterested profit maximizers with perfect willpower, which has become so
embedded in antitrust policy, to predict or explain anticompetitive harm. But
reliance on these rational-choice theories will recede in the coming years as they

351. As Commissioner Kovacic has noted, there is still the risk that plaintiffs will sue
under state baby FTC Acts. See Dissenting Statement of William E. Kovacic, In re
Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. C-4234 (F.T.C. Jan. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122kovacic.pdf. It remains to be seen, however,
to what extent this threat will come to fruition.
352. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984);
Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980); Boise Cascade Corp. v.
FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
353. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120–21
(2009) (Roberts, C.J.) (noting that the Court has “repeatedly emphasized the importance of
clear rules in antitrust law”); see also Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17,
22 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, J.) (stating that antitrust rules “must be clear enough for lawyers
to explain them to clients”); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234
(1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.) (“Rules that seek to embody every economic complexity and
qualification may well, through the vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive,
undercutting the very economic ends they seek to serve.”).
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fail to explain actual market behavior. Here, the behavioral economics literature
and other interdisciplinary economic theories will advance competition policy in
understanding such behavior.
Business marketing executives have long understood behavioral economics.
Next came the behavioral economists and legal scholars, and now antitrust lawyers
and policy makers are starting to study behavioral economics. The Supreme
Court’s economic thinking, as reflected in Trinko and Leegin, still lags. But
behavioral antitrust is no longer on the horizon.
Behavioral economics is not a celebration of our shortcomings. Putting aside
self-interest, which is not accepted as a desirable norm, we will continually strive
toward improving our cognitive abilities and willpower. Perhaps one day, society
may evolve in terms of rationality and willpower to more closely mirror the
Chicago School model. In the Paradiso, Dante described the light in the form of a
river pouring its splendour on the banks. But as Beatrice explained, “The river and
the topazes that pass into it and out and the laughter of the flowers are shadowy
forecasts of their truth; not that these things are imperfect in themselves, but the
defect is in thyself, that thy vision is not yet so exalted.”354 In understanding better
how we err, we perhaps can find ways to improve ourselves and the way we
interact with others and, in doing so, instill rules of law that more accurately reflect
this enhanced understanding.

354. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY: PARADISO, Canto XXX, at 435 (John D.
Sinclair trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1961).

